制造商在环保行动中的努力和平台对信息共享的需求

Xiaogang Lin , Ying-Ju Chen , Hui Xiong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

越来越多的消费者有了环保意识,平台和制造商投资环保型经营和生产,以刺激需求,履行社会责任。本文研究了在转售或代理销售中,平台是否应与两家制造商共享其私人需求信息。制造商通过平台向消费者提供两种可替代产品。通过将环保努力纳入博弈论模型,我们表明,当平台作为转售商时,信息共享总是有利于制造商。然而,考虑到环保投资的低效率,隐藏信息对平台更有利。对于平台而言,她愿意向一家或两家效率相对较高的制造商披露信息。然而,当代理销售效率较低时(较高),平台愿意向两个制造商(只有一个制造商)披露信息。此外,当制造商在生态友好水平上的竞争更加激烈时,平台更有可能在转售时向一家或两家制造商披露信息,但在代理销售时,由于生态友好水平的竞争更加激烈,平台无法向更多制造商披露信息。此外,两家制造商的环保水平总是对需求信号做出积极响应。最后,我们考虑了绿色和非绿色制造商在碳排放方面的差异。我们发现,在减少碳排放方面,向两家制造商披露需求信息比只与一家制造商分享信息更有效。
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Manufacturers’ efforts and platform’s demand information sharing in eco-friendly actions

More and more consumers have an awareness of environmental protection, and platforms and manufacturers invest in eco-friendly operating and manufacturing to stimulate demand and fulfill their social responsibilities. Our paper investigates whether the platform should share her private demand information with two manufacturers in the reselling or agency selling. The manufacturers offer consumers two substitutable products through the platform. By incorporating eco-friendly efforts into our game-theoretic model, we show that information sharing always benefits manufacturers when the platform serves as a reseller. However, hiding information is preferable for the platform, considering the low efficiency of eco-friendly investment. For the platform, she is willing to disclose information to one or both manufacturers with relatively high efficiency. Nevertheless, the platform is willing to disclose information to both manufacturers (only one manufacturer) when the efficiency is low (high) in the agency selling. Moreover, when manufacturers compete more intensely on eco-friendly levels, the platform is more likely to disclose information to one or both manufacturers in the reselling, but more intense competition for eco-friendly levels prevents the platform from disclosing information to more manufacturers in the agency selling. Furthermore, both manufacturers’ eco-friendly levels always respond positively to the demand signal. Finally, we consider the disparity in carbon emissions between green and non-green manufacturers in the extension. We find that disclosing the demand information to both manufacturers is more efficient in reducing carbon emissions than sharing with only one manufacturer.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.20
自引率
16.00%
发文量
285
审稿时长
62 days
期刊介绍: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is a reputable journal that publishes high-quality articles covering a wide range of topics in the field of logistics and transportation research. The journal welcomes submissions on various subjects, including transport economics, transport infrastructure and investment appraisal, evaluation of public policies related to transportation, empirical and analytical studies of logistics management practices and performance, logistics and operations models, and logistics and supply chain management. Part E aims to provide informative and well-researched articles that contribute to the understanding and advancement of the field. The content of the journal is complementary to other prestigious journals in transportation research, such as Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Part B: Methodological, Part C: Emerging Technologies, Part D: Transport and Environment, and Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. Together, these journals form a comprehensive and cohesive reference for current research in transportation science.
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