动机很重要:关于惩罚表达功能的实验证据

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004
Daniele Nosenzo , Erte Xiao , Nina Xue
{"title":"动机很重要:关于惩罚表达功能的实验证据","authors":"Daniele Nosenzo ,&nbsp;Erte Xiao ,&nbsp;Nina Xue","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher's motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent's outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other it is other-regarding (i.e., potentially benefits a third party). We find that self-serving punishment reduces the social stigma of selfish behavior, while other-regarding punishment does not. Self-serving punishment is thus less effective at encouraging compliance and is more likely to backfire. We further show that the normative message is somewhat weaker when punishment is less costly for the punisher. Our findings have implications for the design of punishment mechanisms and highlight the importance of the punisher's motives in expressing norms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"148 ","pages":"Pages 44-67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001143/pdfft?md5=016fe472bdbf9f3cc6a02cb91f1cc78f&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001143-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment\",\"authors\":\"Daniele Nosenzo ,&nbsp;Erte Xiao ,&nbsp;Nina Xue\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher's motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent's outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other it is other-regarding (i.e., potentially benefits a third party). We find that self-serving punishment reduces the social stigma of selfish behavior, while other-regarding punishment does not. Self-serving punishment is thus less effective at encouraging compliance and is more likely to backfire. We further show that the normative message is somewhat weaker when punishment is less costly for the punisher. Our findings have implications for the design of punishment mechanisms and highlight the importance of the punisher's motives in expressing norms.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48291,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Games and Economic Behavior\",\"volume\":\"148 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 44-67\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001143/pdfft?md5=016fe472bdbf9f3cc6a02cb91f1cc78f&pid=1-s2.0-S0899825624001143-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Games and Economic Behavior\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001143\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001143","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

有关惩罚和亲社会行为的文献得出了相互矛盾的结论。在某些环境中,惩罚会挤掉亲社会行为并适得其反;而在另一些环境中,惩罚则会促进亲社会性。我们通过一个新颖的实验来研究惩罚者的动机是否有助于调和这些结果,在这个实验中,行为主体在两个环境中的结果是相同的,但在其中一个环境中,先发制人的惩罚计划是为自己服务的(即可能使惩罚者受益),而在另一个环境中,惩罚计划是为他人服务的(即可能使第三方受益)。我们发现,利己型惩罚能减少自私行为的社会耻辱感,而利他型惩罚则不能。因此,利己的惩罚在鼓励人们遵纪守法方面效果较差,而且更有可能适得其反。我们进一步发现,当惩罚者付出的代价较低时,规范信息的作用就会减弱。我们的研究结果对惩罚机制的设计具有启示意义,并强调了惩罚者在表达规范时动机的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The motive matters: Experimental evidence on the expressive function of punishment

The literature on punishment and prosocial behavior has presented conflicting findings. In some settings, punishment crowds out prosocial behavior and backfires; in others, however, it promotes prosociality. We examine whether the punisher's motives can help reconcile these results through a novel experiment in which the agent's outcomes are identical in two environments, but in one the pre-emptive punishment scheme is self-serving (i.e., potentially benefits the punisher), while in the other it is other-regarding (i.e., potentially benefits a third party). We find that self-serving punishment reduces the social stigma of selfish behavior, while other-regarding punishment does not. Self-serving punishment is thus less effective at encouraging compliance and is more likely to backfire. We further show that the normative message is somewhat weaker when punishment is less costly for the punisher. Our findings have implications for the design of punishment mechanisms and highlight the importance of the punisher's motives in expressing norms.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options Cooperating with yourself Risk preferences of learning algorithms Complete conditional type structures Inference from biased polls
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1