结构侵蚀

IF 0.6 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2024-09-17 DOI:10.1111/phis.12269

Aliosha Barranco Lopez

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引用次数: 0

摘要

道德侵蚀说的是，道德因素会影响我们在认识论上有理由相信什么。我提出了两个类似于道德侵蚀文献中常见例子的激励性案例，以说明影响认识论合理性的是行为者的承诺和信念，而不是情境中的道德因素。我把这种观点称为结构性侵占。

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Structural encroachment

Moral encroachment states that moral factors can make a difference to what we are epistemically justified in believing. I present two motivating cases that resemble a common example in the moral encroachment literature to show that the agent's commitments and beliefs, and not the moral factors of the situation, influence epistemic justification. I call this view Structural Encroachment.

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