情感与对认识论上的可责性的现象把握

IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2024-09-17 DOI:10.1111/phis.12277
Tricia Magalotti
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我考虑了认识判断似乎不如道德判断那么情绪化这一观察结果的潜在影响。我认为,无论情感是否是责备的必要条件,责备情感在道德领域确实发挥着重要的认识论作用。它们使我们能够把握有关道德可责性的命题,从而以一种特殊的方式领会其意义。此外,我认为,如果我们在认识论领域普遍缺乏责备情绪,那么我们就无法把握关于认识论上的责备性的命题。因此,无论一个人的认识论责备理论是什么,我们在认识论上的失误值得责备的说法与我们没有认识论上的责备情绪的说法之间都存在着紧张关系。
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Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness
In this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a special way. Further, I argue that if we generally lack blaming emotions in the epistemic domain, then we are unable to grasp propositions about epistemic blameworthiness. As a result, regardless of one's theory of epistemic blame, there emerges a tension between the claims that we are epistemically blameworthy for our epistemic failings and the claim that we do not feel epistemic blaming emotions.
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来源期刊
Philosophical Issues
Philosophical Issues PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
14.30%
发文量
23
期刊最新文献
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