{"title":"非理想认识理性","authors":"Nick Hughes","doi":"10.1111/phis.12273","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Non‐ideal epistemic rationality\",\"authors\":\"Nick Hughes\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phis.12273\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46360,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophical Issues\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophical Issues\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12273\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Issues","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12273","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop a broadly reliabilist theory of non‐ideal epistemic rationality and argue that if it is correct we should reject the recently popular idea that the standards of non‐ideal epistemic rationality are mere social conventions.
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