Fernando J. Ribeiro , João A. Peças Lopes , Filipe J. Soares , André G. Madureira
{"title":"欧洲一体化电力市场中频率约束储备合作的新型 TSO 结算方案","authors":"Fernando J. Ribeiro , João A. Peças Lopes , Filipe J. Soares , André G. Madureira","doi":"10.1016/j.jup.2024.101821","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) Cooperation is a European effort to integrate several countries in an integrated international electricity market platform for FCR procurement. In this market, Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) are on the supply side and Transmission System Operators (TSOs) on the demand side. This paper proposes a novel settlement scheme for sharing costs among TSOs; it proposes no changes to existing market clearing rules or to the existing settlement of the BSPs’ revenues. It is shown that the current TSO settlement scheme is an inequitable mechanism that originates negative costs for some TSOs in specific conditions, which are extensively discussed. The proposed TSO settlement scheme overcomes these inequities. In the proposed scheme, TSOs begin paying the local BSPs for the cleared bids needed locally, and the remaining imports are calculated in a subsequent step. Doing so avoids using the so-called “import/export costs”, which are demonstrated to be the source of the inequities in the current scheme. It is shown that if the proposed pricing scheme had been adopted from July 2019 to December 2022, all TSOs would have been affected. Specifically, the most negatively impacted TSO would have its accumulated costs increased by 16% and the most positively impacted TSO would have its accumulated cost decreased by 32%. The inequities of the current mechanism amount to more than 50 M€ or 7.4% of the total accumulated costs. Although the proposed mechanism is tested here under the FCR Cooperation, it can be applied to other markets where the rules allow different local settlement prices.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":23554,"journal":{"name":"Utilities Policy","volume":"91 ","pages":"Article 101821"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A novel TSO settlement scheme for the Frequency Containment Reserve Cooperation in Europe’s integrated electricity market\",\"authors\":\"Fernando J. Ribeiro , João A. Peças Lopes , Filipe J. Soares , André G. Madureira\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jup.2024.101821\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) Cooperation is a European effort to integrate several countries in an integrated international electricity market platform for FCR procurement. In this market, Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) are on the supply side and Transmission System Operators (TSOs) on the demand side. This paper proposes a novel settlement scheme for sharing costs among TSOs; it proposes no changes to existing market clearing rules or to the existing settlement of the BSPs’ revenues. It is shown that the current TSO settlement scheme is an inequitable mechanism that originates negative costs for some TSOs in specific conditions, which are extensively discussed. The proposed TSO settlement scheme overcomes these inequities. In the proposed scheme, TSOs begin paying the local BSPs for the cleared bids needed locally, and the remaining imports are calculated in a subsequent step. Doing so avoids using the so-called “import/export costs”, which are demonstrated to be the source of the inequities in the current scheme. It is shown that if the proposed pricing scheme had been adopted from July 2019 to December 2022, all TSOs would have been affected. Specifically, the most negatively impacted TSO would have its accumulated costs increased by 16% and the most positively impacted TSO would have its accumulated cost decreased by 32%. The inequities of the current mechanism amount to more than 50 M€ or 7.4% of the total accumulated costs. Although the proposed mechanism is tested here under the FCR Cooperation, it can be applied to other markets where the rules allow different local settlement prices.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":23554,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Utilities Policy\",\"volume\":\"91 \",\"pages\":\"Article 101821\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Utilities Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178724001140\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ENERGY & FUELS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Utilities Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178724001140","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ENERGY & FUELS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A novel TSO settlement scheme for the Frequency Containment Reserve Cooperation in Europe’s integrated electricity market
Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) Cooperation is a European effort to integrate several countries in an integrated international electricity market platform for FCR procurement. In this market, Balancing Service Providers (BSPs) are on the supply side and Transmission System Operators (TSOs) on the demand side. This paper proposes a novel settlement scheme for sharing costs among TSOs; it proposes no changes to existing market clearing rules or to the existing settlement of the BSPs’ revenues. It is shown that the current TSO settlement scheme is an inequitable mechanism that originates negative costs for some TSOs in specific conditions, which are extensively discussed. The proposed TSO settlement scheme overcomes these inequities. In the proposed scheme, TSOs begin paying the local BSPs for the cleared bids needed locally, and the remaining imports are calculated in a subsequent step. Doing so avoids using the so-called “import/export costs”, which are demonstrated to be the source of the inequities in the current scheme. It is shown that if the proposed pricing scheme had been adopted from July 2019 to December 2022, all TSOs would have been affected. Specifically, the most negatively impacted TSO would have its accumulated costs increased by 16% and the most positively impacted TSO would have its accumulated cost decreased by 32%. The inequities of the current mechanism amount to more than 50 M€ or 7.4% of the total accumulated costs. Although the proposed mechanism is tested here under the FCR Cooperation, it can be applied to other markets where the rules allow different local settlement prices.
期刊介绍:
Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services.
Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.