{"title":"ESG 合同与利益相关者的利益是一致还是竞争？","authors":"Maria Gaia Soana","doi":"10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102058","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper investigates whether ESG-linked managerial incentives, also known as ESG contracting, align or compete with stakeholder interests in the banking sector. The few related literature, focussed on non-financial companies, shows arguments both pro and against pay for sustainability. Using a panel data set of 595 worldwide listed banks for the period 2010–2021, the paper studies the effectiveness of ESG incentives in improving ESG performance and limiting ESG controversies. ESG contracting is shown to improve both ESG performance and ESG disputes, thus suggesting that it is more symbolic than substantial in meeting stakeholder interests. ESG strategy, ESG committee and managerial risk-taking are significant channels through which ESG incentives affect ESG performance and ESG controversies in the banking sector.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48119,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 102058"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124001240/pdfft?md5=b3ab5dd038a267f9720178820f5ea374&pid=1-s2.0-S1042443124001240-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does ESG contracting align or compete with stakeholder interests?\",\"authors\":\"Maria Gaia Soana\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.intfin.2024.102058\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The paper investigates whether ESG-linked managerial incentives, also known as ESG contracting, align or compete with stakeholder interests in the banking sector. The few related literature, focussed on non-financial companies, shows arguments both pro and against pay for sustainability. Using a panel data set of 595 worldwide listed banks for the period 2010–2021, the paper studies the effectiveness of ESG incentives in improving ESG performance and limiting ESG controversies. ESG contracting is shown to improve both ESG performance and ESG disputes, thus suggesting that it is more symbolic than substantial in meeting stakeholder interests. ESG strategy, ESG committee and managerial risk-taking are significant channels through which ESG incentives affect ESG performance and ESG controversies in the banking sector.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48119,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money\",\"volume\":\"96 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102058\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124001240/pdfft?md5=b3ab5dd038a267f9720178820f5ea374&pid=1-s2.0-S1042443124001240-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124001240\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions & Money","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443124001240","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Does ESG contracting align or compete with stakeholder interests?
The paper investigates whether ESG-linked managerial incentives, also known as ESG contracting, align or compete with stakeholder interests in the banking sector. The few related literature, focussed on non-financial companies, shows arguments both pro and against pay for sustainability. Using a panel data set of 595 worldwide listed banks for the period 2010–2021, the paper studies the effectiveness of ESG incentives in improving ESG performance and limiting ESG controversies. ESG contracting is shown to improve both ESG performance and ESG disputes, thus suggesting that it is more symbolic than substantial in meeting stakeholder interests. ESG strategy, ESG committee and managerial risk-taking are significant channels through which ESG incentives affect ESG performance and ESG controversies in the banking sector.
期刊介绍：
International trade, financing and investments, and the related cash and credit transactions, have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years. The international monetary system has continued to evolve to accommodate the need for foreign-currency denominated transactions and in the process has provided opportunities for its ongoing observation and study. The purpose of the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the international aspects of financial markets, institutions and money. Theoretical/conceptual and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • International financial markets • International securities markets • Foreign exchange markets • Eurocurrency markets • International syndications • Term structures of Eurocurrency rates • Determination of exchange rates • Information, speculation and parity • Forward rates and swaps • International payment mechanisms • International commercial banking; • International investment banking • Central bank intervention • International monetary systems • Balance of payments.
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