当我们暂停判断时,我们该怎么做?

IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2024-09-20 DOI:10.1111/phis.12278
Anne Meylan
{"title":"当我们暂停判断时,我们该怎么做?","authors":"Anne Meylan","doi":"10.1111/phis.12278","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action. The main goal of this article is to defend a precise account of the action that we take when we suspend our judgement: the Preventing Account. The Preventing Account has both the advantage of (i) accounting for familiar situations in which subjects suspend judgements and (ii) of explaining the tendency, which is widespread in the philosophical tradition (from sceptics to pragmatists), to consider suspension of judgement as something that is (at least, to some degree) difficult to achieve.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What do we do when we suspend judgement?\",\"authors\":\"Anne Meylan\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/phis.12278\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action. The main goal of this article is to defend a precise account of the action that we take when we suspend our judgement: the Preventing Account. The Preventing Account has both the advantage of (i) accounting for familiar situations in which subjects suspend judgements and (ii) of explaining the tendency, which is widespread in the philosophical tradition (from sceptics to pragmatists), to consider suspension of judgement as something that is (at least, to some degree) difficult to achieve.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46360,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophical Issues\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophical Issues\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12278\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Issues","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12278","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

根据经典观点,暂停判断与相信和不相信一样,是一种认知状态。然而,正如一些学者(Crawford 2022;Lord 2020;McGrath 2021a、2021b;Sosa 2019、2021)所指出的,中止判断也是在执行某种心理行动。本文的主要目的是为我们在暂缓判断时所采取的行动辩护:"预防说"。预防说 "的优势在于:(i) 解释了人们所熟悉的中止判断的情形;(ii) 解释了哲学传统(从怀疑论者到实用主义者)中普遍存在的倾向,即认为中止判断是(至少在某种程度上)难以实现的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
What do we do when we suspend judgement?
According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action. The main goal of this article is to defend a precise account of the action that we take when we suspend our judgement: the Preventing Account. The Preventing Account has both the advantage of (i) accounting for familiar situations in which subjects suspend judgements and (ii) of explaining the tendency, which is widespread in the philosophical tradition (from sceptics to pragmatists), to consider suspension of judgement as something that is (at least, to some degree) difficult to achieve.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Philosophical Issues
Philosophical Issues PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
14.30%
发文量
23
期刊最新文献
Understanding friendship Epistemic normativity without epistemic teleology Reasons and belief The relational foundations of epistemic normativity The limits of experience: Dogmatism and moral epistemology
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1