{"title":"碳市场设计和市场情绪","authors":"Grischa Perino","doi":"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103057","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Concerns about systematic price distortions in the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) have risen in recent years. This paper shows how carbon-market design affects the impact of market sentiment, i.e. systematic deviations of price expectations from fundamentals by at least some market participants, on equilibrium prices. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) of the EU ETS that adjusts supply based on past allowance banking undermines self-stabilization of the carbon market by discouraging rational intertemporal arbitrage. The MSR increases vulnerability of the EU ETS to market sentiments. Initially, the allowance price responds more to distorted expectations while the MSR (partially) prevents the distortion to spread across periods. Making the MSR more responsive to banking decisions increases the likelihood that distorted expectations turn out to be correct ex post. In contrast, a mechanism that adjust the cap based on the current allowance price does not face a trade off between stabilizing prices in the present and the future.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":15763,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","volume":"128 ","pages":"Article 103057"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001311/pdfft?md5=638cfae0ea37b21c06d089ce5df7ce2d&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624001311-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Carbon market design and market sentiment\",\"authors\":\"Grischa Perino\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103057\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Concerns about systematic price distortions in the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) have risen in recent years. This paper shows how carbon-market design affects the impact of market sentiment, i.e. systematic deviations of price expectations from fundamentals by at least some market participants, on equilibrium prices. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) of the EU ETS that adjusts supply based on past allowance banking undermines self-stabilization of the carbon market by discouraging rational intertemporal arbitrage. The MSR increases vulnerability of the EU ETS to market sentiments. Initially, the allowance price responds more to distorted expectations while the MSR (partially) prevents the distortion to spread across periods. Making the MSR more responsive to banking decisions increases the likelihood that distorted expectations turn out to be correct ex post. In contrast, a mechanism that adjust the cap based on the current allowance price does not face a trade off between stabilizing prices in the present and the future.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15763,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management\",\"volume\":\"128 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103057\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001311/pdfft?md5=638cfae0ea37b21c06d089ce5df7ce2d&pid=1-s2.0-S0095069624001311-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001311\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Environmental Economics and Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069624001311","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Concerns about systematic price distortions in the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) have risen in recent years. This paper shows how carbon-market design affects the impact of market sentiment, i.e. systematic deviations of price expectations from fundamentals by at least some market participants, on equilibrium prices. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) of the EU ETS that adjusts supply based on past allowance banking undermines self-stabilization of the carbon market by discouraging rational intertemporal arbitrage. The MSR increases vulnerability of the EU ETS to market sentiments. Initially, the allowance price responds more to distorted expectations while the MSR (partially) prevents the distortion to spread across periods. Making the MSR more responsive to banking decisions increases the likelihood that distorted expectations turn out to be correct ex post. In contrast, a mechanism that adjust the cap based on the current allowance price does not face a trade off between stabilizing prices in the present and the future.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.