自私的机器?从自然选择的力量和局限来理解先进人工智能的发展

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02226-3
Maarten Boudry, Simon Friederich
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一些哲学家和机器学习专家推测,超级智能人工智能(AI)一旦出现,将从人类手中夺走权力,并可能带来灾难性后果。丹-亨德里克斯(Dan Hendrycks)最近支持这种担忧,认为人工智能系统将经历自然选择的进化,这将赋予它们进化生物特有的自我保护、支配和资源积累的本能驱动力。在本文中,我们认为这一论点目前并不令人信服。正如我们所指出的,进化过程可以在多个维度上或多或少具有达尔文主义色彩。利用彼得-戈弗雷-史密斯(Peter Godfrey-Smith)的达尔文空间框架,我们认为,进化越是自上而下、由智能机构指导和驱动,其达尔文范式就越少。然后,我们将 "驯化 "的概念应用于人工智能的进化,虽然理论上符合自然选择的最低定义,但这种进化是通过有远见的智能代理的思维,根据它们所希望的选择标准(可能是温顺、服从和不侵犯等特征)进行的。在存在这种智能规划的情况下,人工智能的选择,甚至是在竞争激烈、残酷无情的市场环境中的选择,最终是否会偏向于 "自私 "的特质,这一点并不清楚。不过,我们最终还是有条件地同意亨德里克斯的观点:如果超级智能人工智能最终 "野蛮生长",以真正达尔文主义的方式进行竞争,在没有人类监督的情况下自主繁殖,这可能会对人类社会构成严重威胁。
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The selfish machine? On the power and limitation of natural selection to understand the development of advanced AI

Some philosophers and machine learning experts have speculated that superintelligent Artificial Intelligences (AIs), if and when they arrive on the scene, will wrestle away power from humans, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Dan Hendrycks has recently buttressed such worries by arguing that AI systems will undergo evolution by natural selection, which will endow them with instinctive drives for self-preservation, dominance and resource accumulation that are typical of evolved creatures. In this paper, we argue that this argument is not compelling as it stands. Evolutionary processes, as we point out, can be more or less Darwinian along a number of dimensions. Making use of Peter Godfrey-Smith’s framework of Darwinian spaces, we argue that the more evolution is top-down, directed and driven by intelligent agency, the less paradigmatically Darwinian it becomes. We then apply the concept of “domestication” to AI evolution, which, although theoretically satisfying the minimal definition of natural selection, is channeled through the minds of fore-sighted and intelligent agents, based on selection criteria desirable to them (which could be traits like docility, obedience and non-aggression). In the presence of such intelligent planning, it is not clear that selection of AIs, even selection in a competitive and ruthless market environment, will end up favoring “selfish” traits. In the end, however, we do agree with Hendrycks’ conditionally: If superintelligent AIs end up “going feral” and competing in a truly Darwinian fashion, reproducing autonomously and without human supervision, this could pose a grave danger to human societies.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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