{"title":"灾难阴影下的传播","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105916","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We perform distributional comparative statics in a cheap talk model of adaptation. Receiver borne adaptation costs drive a wedge between the objectives of sender and receiver that is increasing in the magnitude of adaptation. We allow for infinite supports with infinite disagreement at the extremes and compare communication to unconstrained delegation. We study increases in risk that arise from transformations of the state variable. We find that linear transformations (implying increases in variance) decrease communication and delegation payoffs but do not change their ranking. By contrast, increasing, convex transformations (implying increases in <em>tail risk</em>) decrease the communication payoff relative to the delegation payoff. Our finding extends to the comparison of distributions with thin versus heavy tails.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Communication in the shadow of catastrophe\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jet.2024.105916\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We perform distributional comparative statics in a cheap talk model of adaptation. Receiver borne adaptation costs drive a wedge between the objectives of sender and receiver that is increasing in the magnitude of adaptation. We allow for infinite supports with infinite disagreement at the extremes and compare communication to unconstrained delegation. We study increases in risk that arise from transformations of the state variable. We find that linear transformations (implying increases in variance) decrease communication and delegation payoffs but do not change their ranking. By contrast, increasing, convex transformations (implying increases in <em>tail risk</em>) decrease the communication payoff relative to the delegation payoff. Our finding extends to the comparison of distributions with thin versus heavy tails.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48393,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124001224\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053124001224","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We perform distributional comparative statics in a cheap talk model of adaptation. Receiver borne adaptation costs drive a wedge between the objectives of sender and receiver that is increasing in the magnitude of adaptation. We allow for infinite supports with infinite disagreement at the extremes and compare communication to unconstrained delegation. We study increases in risk that arise from transformations of the state variable. We find that linear transformations (implying increases in variance) decrease communication and delegation payoffs but do not change their ranking. By contrast, increasing, convex transformations (implying increases in tail risk) decrease the communication payoff relative to the delegation payoff. Our finding extends to the comparison of distributions with thin versus heavy tails.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Theory publishes original research on economic theory and emphasizes the theoretical analysis of economic models, including the study of related mathematical techniques. JET is the leading journal in economic theory. It is also one of nine core journals in all of economics. Among these journals, the Journal of Economic Theory ranks fourth in impact-adjusted citations.