Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

英文中文

Discrete/continuous choice models and representative consumer theory

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-04-17 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012

Jean-Pierre Dubé , Joonhwi Joo , Kyeongbae Kim

We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of discrete/continuous choice, additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findings should be of interest to the literature in macro, trade, industrial organization, labor, and ideal price index measurement that use representative consumer models, such as CES and its variants. Our results generalize such representative consumer formulations to the broad, empirically-relevant class of models of behavior that are routinely used in the discrete/continuous choice analysis of micro data, including specifications that do not suffer from the IIA property and that allow for heterogeneous consumer preferences and incomes. These flexible discrete/continuous choice formulations also overcome many of the known limitations of CES and its variants for equilibrium prices and markups, trade liberalization effects and welfare analysis. We also discuss quasi-linear integrability in the case where products are indivisible and integrability no longer holds. If we relax homotheticity, we find that integrability generically fails to hold except in the special case of IIA preferences.

{"title":"Discrete/continuous choice models and representative consumer theory","authors":"Jean-Pierre Dubé , Joonhwi Joo , Kyeongbae Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of <em>discrete/continuous choice,</em> additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findings should be of interest to the literature in macro, trade, industrial organization, labor, and ideal price index measurement that use representative consumer models, such as CES and its variants. Our results generalize such representative consumer formulations to the broad, empirically-relevant class of models of behavior that are routinely used in the discrete/continuous choice analysis of micro data, including specifications that do not suffer from the IIA property and that allow for heterogeneous consumer preferences and incomes. These flexible discrete/continuous choice formulations also overcome many of the known limitations of CES and its variants for equilibrium prices and markups, trade liberalization effects and welfare analysis. We also discuss quasi-linear integrability in the case where products are indivisible and integrability no longer holds. If we relax homotheticity, we find that integrability generically fails to hold except in the special case of IIA preferences.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106012"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143855387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Business cycles fluctuations in three-sector intertemporal equilibrium models 三部门时际均衡模型中的商业周期波动

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-04-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106010

Kazuo Nishimura , Florian Pelgrin , Alain Venditti

This paper introduces a novel mechanism driving endogenous business cycle fluctuations within a frictionless three-sector intertemporal equilibrium model. We emphasize the critical role of consumer preferences as a primary driver of cyclical dynamics by considering a consumption bundle composed of a pure consumption good and a mixed consumption-investment good that simultaneously serves as both a final consumption good and a capital-accumulating investment good. Endogenous fluctuations naturally arise from sectoral capital intensity differences, an intertemporal consumption trade-off between the two goods, or the interaction of both mechanisms. We offer a detailed characterization of the economy's dynamics, identifying the Hopf bifurcation conditions that trigger persistent cyclical behavior. Additionally, we explore the periodicity of the resulting limit cycles, providing insights into how shifts in preferences and sectoral complementarities can generate self-sustained macroeconomic fluctuations.

本文在无摩擦三部门跨期均衡模型中引入了一种驱动内生商业周期波动的新机制。我们通过考虑由纯消费产品和消费-投资混合产品组成的消费束，强调消费者偏好作为周期动态主要驱动力的关键作用。内生波动自然来自部门资本密集度差异、两种商品之间的跨期消费权衡或两种机制的相互作用。我们提供了经济动态的详细特征，确定了引发持续周期性行为的霍普夫分岔条件。此外，我们还探讨了由此产生的极限周期的周期性，为偏好和部门互补性的变化如何产生自我维持的宏观经济波动提供了见解。

引用次数: 0

Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-04-14 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106009

Itai Arieli , Galit Ashkenazi-Golan , Ron Peretz , Yevgeny Tsodikovich

Agents in a network adopt an innovation if a certain fraction of their neighbors has already done so. We study the minimal contagious set size required for a successful innovation adoption by the entire population, and provide upper and lower bounds on it. Since detailed information about the network structure is often unavailable, we study bounds that depend only on the degree distribution of the network – a simple statistic of the network topology. Moreover, as our bounds are robust to small changes in the degree distribution, they also apply to large networks for which the degree distribution can only be approximated. Applying our bounds to growing networks shows that the minimal contagious set size is linear in the number of nodes. Consequently, for outside of knife-edge cases (such as the star-shaped network), contagion cannot be achieved without seeding a significant fraction of the population. This finding highlights the resilience of networks and demonstrates a high penetration cost in the corresponding markets.

引用次数: 0

Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-04-11 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008

Bernhard Kasberger , Kyle Woodward

Multi-unit auctions frequently take place in environments with limited information, such as in new markets and under volatile macroeconomic conditions. We characterize optimal prior-free bids in such auctions; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. We show that optimal bids are readily computable in this environment despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information. In the pay-as-bid auction the prior-free bid is unique; in the uniform-price auction the prior-free bid is unique if the bidder is allowed to determine the quantities for which they bid, as in many practical applications. We compare prior-free bids and auction outcomes across auction formats; while outcome comparisons are ambiguous, pay-as-bid auctions tend to generate greater revenue and welfare than uniform-price auctions when bidders' values are dispersed. We also compare outcomes in limited-information environments to outcomes in high-information environments, modeled as bidders playing Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and show that Bayes-Nash outcomes dominate prior-free outcomes when the auction is competitive.

{"title":"Bidding in multi-unit auctions under limited information","authors":"Bernhard Kasberger , Kyle Woodward","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.106008","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Multi-unit auctions frequently take place in environments with limited information, such as in new markets and under volatile macroeconomic conditions. We characterize optimal prior-free bids in such auctions; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. We show that optimal bids are readily computable in this environment despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information. In the pay-as-bid auction the prior-free bid is unique; in the uniform-price auction the prior-free bid is unique if the bidder is allowed to determine the quantities for which they bid, as in many practical applications. We compare prior-free bids and auction outcomes across auction formats; while outcome comparisons are ambiguous, pay-as-bid auctions tend to generate greater revenue and welfare than uniform-price auctions when bidders' values are dispersed. We also compare outcomes in limited-information environments to outcomes in high-information environments, modeled as bidders playing Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and show that Bayes-Nash outcomes dominate prior-free outcomes when the auction is competitive.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"226 ","pages":"Article 106008"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143858944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An alternative approach for nonparametric analysis of random utility models

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105998

Christopher Turansick

We readdress the problem of nonparametric statistical testing of random utility models proposed in Kitamura and Stoye (2018). Although their test is elegant, it is subject to computational constraints which leaves execution of the test infeasible in many applications. We note that much of the computational burden in Kitamura and Stoye's test is due to their test defining a polyhedral cone through its vertices rather than its faces. We propose an alternative but equivalent hypothesis test for random utility models. This test relies on a series of equality and inequality constraints which defines the faces of the corresponding polyhedral cone. Building on our testing procedure, we develop a novel axiomatization of the random utility model.

引用次数: 0

Costly subjective learning

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-03-27 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105997

Youichiro Higashi , Kazuya Hyogo , Norio Takeoka

We examine the behavioral foundation of rational inattention within a menu-choice framework. Unlike previous studies, our approach enables the unique identification of nonadditive information costs. The nonadditivity of information costs makes the effective cost inherently dependent on benefits of information. In contrast to additive cost models, this feature may lead to a violation of the preference for early resolution of menu uncertainty. Early resolution is typically preferable as it allows the agent to fine-tune information for relevant menus. However, if the effective cost function is convex in benefits of information, late resolution may reduce the effective information costs. The violation occurs when this cost-reduction effect outweighs the benefits of early resolution.

引用次数: 0

Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105996

Daniel Bougt , Gagan Ghosh , Heng Liu

We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or ‘pay-as-bid’ auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the ‘highest losing bid’ pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend to some open auction formats.

引用次数: 0

The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995

Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li

This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption relies on explicitly considering the screening role of market tightness. The assumption can be weakened further if we assume that agents' matching probability strictly increases in market tightness. In addition to providing theoretical insights, we study examples to demonstrate how generalized sorting facilitates the study of market imperfections under search and informational frictions. In our examples, indivisibility, price limits, and the minimum wage violate GSW's sorting assumption but remain tractable under generalized sorting. Thus, an additional contribution of this paper is the expansion in applicability of GSW's approach.

{"title":"The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection","authors":"Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jet.2025.105995","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption relies on explicitly considering the screening role of market tightness. The assumption can be weakened further if we assume that agents' matching probability strictly increases in market tightness. In addition to providing theoretical insights, we study examples to demonstrate how generalized sorting facilitates the study of market imperfections under search and informational frictions. In our examples, indivisibility, price limits, and the minimum wage violate GSW's sorting assumption but remain tractable under generalized sorting. Thus, an additional contribution of this paper is the expansion in applicability of GSW's approach.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48393,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"225 ","pages":"Article 105995"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143644113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Offshoring and the distribution of skills

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105994

Hiroshi Goto , Yan Ma , Nobuyuki Takeuchi

We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price if the gap between the median skill levels of the two countries is sufficiently large. Finally, we demonstrate that an individual's industry of employment primarily determines how they are affected by trade in final goods, whereas their occupation (tasks) shapes how they are impacted by offshoring.

引用次数: 0

Information orders in screening problems

IF 1.4 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-03-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.105993

Andreas Asseyer

This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.

引用次数: 0

下一页尾页

类型

全部化学•材料生命科学医学物理工程技术环境•农林材料科学地球科学法学管理学化学环境科学与生态学计算机科学教育学经济学农林科学人文科学生物学数学物理与天体物理心理学综合性期刊其他工业工程理学历史学农学文学信息工程

数据库

全部 ACS Publications Elsevier ieeexplore Springer The Royal Society of Chemistry Wiley

期刊

Journal of Economic Theory

全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.

﹀