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Sequential network design 顺序网络设计
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-23 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106145
Yang Sun , Wei Zhao , Junjie Zhou
We examine dynamic network formation from a centralized perspective, where a forward-looking social planner constructs one new link between previously unconnected nodes in each period. The planner derives utility from the discounted sum of benefits generated throughout the formation process. Assuming the planner’s instantaneous utility depends monotonically on the aggregate number of walks of various lengths within the network, we derive several key results. First, it is always optimal to form a nested split graph at each stage, regardless of the discount function. Second, when the planner is sufficiently myopic, the optimal strategy uniquely generates a quasi-complete graph in each period. This finding provides a micro-foundation for quasi-complete graphs as natural outcomes of greedy network formation processes. Finally, we extend our analysis to weighted networks, demonstrating the robustness of our results.
我们从中心化的角度考察动态网络的形成，前瞻性的社会规划者在每个时期在先前未连接的节点之间构建一个新的链接。规划者从整个形成过程中产生的贴现收益总和中获得效用。假设规划器的瞬时效用单调地依赖于网络中不同长度的行走总数，我们得到了几个关键结果。首先，无论贴现函数如何，在每个阶段形成嵌套分割图总是最优的。其次，当规划者足够近视时，最优策略在每个周期内唯一地生成一个拟完全图。这一发现为准完全图作为贪婪网络形成过程的自然结果提供了微观基础。最后，我们将我们的分析扩展到加权网络，证明了我们结果的鲁棒性。
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引用次数: 0
Automation and top entrepreneurial income inequality 自动化和最高企业家收入不平等
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-20 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106144
Ömer Faruk Koru
This paper develops a theoretical framework linking automation to the thickness of the top entrepreneurial income distribution, which is approximated by a Pareto distribution. In the model, entrepreneurs face convex labor costs, creating diseconomies of scale. Automation enables them to substitute capital for labor, mitigating the diseconomies and increasing returns to entrepreneurial skill, resulting in a decline in the Pareto parameter and a rise in top entrepreneurial inequality. I test the model’s predictions using U.S. industry-level data on entrepreneurial income and CEO compensation, as well as firm-level data on employment and capital intensity. Consistent with the model’s predictions, greater automation is associated with lower Pareto parameters of the top entrepreneurial income and employment distributions, as well as wider capital-intensity gap among top firms.
本文建立了一个将自动化与顶层企业家收入分配厚度联系起来的理论框架，该框架近似于帕累托分布。在这个模型中，企业家面临着凸出的劳动力成本，造成了规模不经济。自动化使他们能够用资本代替劳动力，减轻了不经济现象，增加了创业技能的回报，导致帕累托参数的下降和顶级创业不平等的上升。我使用美国行业层面的企业家收入和CEO薪酬数据，以及企业层面的就业和资本密集度数据来检验模型的预测。与模型的预测一致，自动化程度越高，企业收入和就业分布的帕累托参数越低，顶级企业之间的资本密集度差距也越大。
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引用次数: 0
Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding 银行挤兑和大规模融资干预
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106143
Luis Araujo , Ryuichiro Izumi , Fabrizio Mattesini
We study how access to wholesale funding affects bank fragility when policymakers can intervene efficiently during a run. In a Diamond-Dybvig environment with a wholesale market, banks can refinance rather than liquidate assets. We show that the effect of wholesale borrowing on fragility depends both on the cost of funds and on the allocation of seniority among creditors. When wholesale lenders are senior, the availability of funds decreases fragility when borrowing is inexpensive; while when borrowing is costly, greater access to wholesale funding increases fragility because it delays intervention and increases depositors’ incentives to run. In contrast, when depositors are senior, wholesale borrowing always decreases fragility. These findings highlight that seniority allocation is a key determinant of how wholesale funding shapes policy responses and bank fragility. In particular, although recent episodes suggest that wholesale investors typically hold seniority, our findings suggest that granting priority to depositors could make the banking system less fragile.
我们研究了当政策制定者能够在挤兑期间有效干预时，获得批发融资如何影响银行的脆弱性。在钻石批发市场的环境中，银行可以再融资，而不是清算资产。我们表明，批发借贷对脆弱性的影响既取决于资金成本，也取决于债权人之间的优先级分配。当批发贷款机构处于优先地位时，当借贷成本低廉时，资金的可获得性降低了脆弱性；而当借贷成本高昂时，更容易获得批发融资会增加脆弱性，因为这会推迟干预，增加储户的挤兑动机。相反，当存款人处于优先级时，批发借贷总是会降低脆弱性。这些发现突出表明，资历分配是大规模融资如何影响政策反应和银行脆弱性的关键决定因素。特别是，尽管最近的事件表明，批发投资者通常持有优先级，但我们的研究结果表明，给予储户优先权可能会使银行体系不那么脆弱。
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引用次数: 0
Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search 竞争性价格歧视、不完全信息和消费者搜索
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106133
Carl-Christian Groh
I study a homogeneous goods’ model in which a consumer attains consumption opportunities via sequential search. Whenever a firm is visited by the consumer, the firm observes a private signal about the consumer’s valuation and price discriminates based on this information. If the signal is sufficiently precise and search costs are at intermediate levels, an equilibrium in which the consumer visits multiple firms with positive probability emerges. At low search costs, firms offer low prices to deter search, and the consumer does not visit multiple firms. The equilibrium prices are minimal if search costs are negligible and, if the signal is sufficiently precise, the equilibrium prices are maximal at intermediate levels of search costs.
我研究了一个同质商品模型，其中消费者通过顺序搜索获得消费机会。每当消费者拜访一家公司时，该公司就会观察到一个关于消费者估值的私人信号，并根据该信息进行价格歧视。如果信号足够精确且搜索成本处于中间水平，那么消费者以正概率访问多个公司的均衡就会出现。在低搜索成本的情况下，公司提供低价来阻止搜索，消费者不会访问多个公司。如果搜索成本可以忽略不计，那么均衡价格是最小的；如果信号足够精确，那么在搜索成本的中间水平上均衡价格是最大的。
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引用次数: 0
Corrigendum to “The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection” [Journal of Economic Theory 225 (2025) 105995] “市场紧度在逆向选择竞争搜索均衡中的筛选作用”的勘误表[经济理论学报225 (2025)105995]
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106124
Hung-Chi Chang , Yiting Li
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引用次数: 0
Coasian dynamics and endogenous learning 高斯动力学和内生性学习
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106136
Tuomas Laiho , Julia Salmi
We study social learning in markets where a monopolistic seller and potential buyers learn from past buyers’ reviews and experiences. Because buyers can wait before purchasing, they have an incentive to free-ride on information from other buyers. The seller has to take this informational externality between buyers into account in her pricing. Our main result is that any Markov perfect equilibrium is inefficient because of too little and too slow sales. This is contrary to the results absent learning. We then show that the seller’s commitment power can alleviate these inefficiencies. In addition, we demonstrate that good news learning causes too little total sales and bad news learning causes too slow sales.
我们研究市场中的社会学习，垄断的卖家和潜在买家从过去买家的评论和经验中学习。因为买家可以在购买前等待，他们有动力免费获取其他买家的信息。卖方在定价时必须考虑到买方之间的信息外部性。我们的主要结论是，由于销售太少和太慢，任何马尔可夫完美均衡都是低效的。这与缺乏学习的结果是相反的。然后，我们证明了卖方的承诺能力可以缓解这些低效率。此外，我们证明了好消息学习导致的总销售太少，坏消息学习导致的销售太慢。
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引用次数: 0
Middlemen, inventories and economic dynamics 中间商、库存和经济动态
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106113
Chao Gu , Lu Wang , Randall Wright
We study dynamics in frictional markets with intermediated trade, where middlemen can buy goods or assets from sellers, hold them as inventory, and sell when contacting appropriate buyers. Importantly, buyers have heterogeneous match-specific valuations, letting us characterize equilibrium in terms of reservation trading strategies (related papers with homogeneous valuations imply bang-bang solutions that are awkward for the economics and mathematics). Using bifurcation theory, we show there are equilibria where market participation, volume, prices, liquidity and other variables fluctuate as self-fulfilling prophecies. The dynamics emerge from strategic considerations, not mechanical assumptions, like increasing returns or other such devices in related models.
我们研究了中介贸易摩擦市场的动态，中间商可以从卖家那里购买商品或资产，将其作为库存，并在联系合适的买家时出售。重要的是，买家有异质匹配特定的估值，这让我们可以用保留交易策略来描述均衡（同质估值的相关论文暗示了对经济学和数学来说很尴尬的砰砰解决方案）。利用分岔理论，我们表明存在均衡，其中市场参与，数量，价格，流动性和其他变量波动作为自我实现的预言。这种动力来自战略考虑，而不是机械假设，比如相关模型中的收益增加或其他类似装置。
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引用次数: 0
Comment on “Assignment problems with complementarities” [J. Econ. Theory 165 (2016) 209-241] “具有互补性的分配问题”述评[J]。经济学。理论165 (2016)209-241]
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2026-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106130
Daniel Kornbluth , Alexey Kushnir , Thanh Nguyen , Rakesh Vohra
Nguyen et al. (2016) introduce the Bundled Probabilistic Serial and Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanisms for allocating bundles of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences over bundles. They present efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties of the two mechanisms, showing both to be ordinally efficient, weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, and asymptotically strategy-proof. We provide counterexamples demonstrating that the Bundled Probabilistic Serial mechanism is not weakly strategy-proof and the Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanism is not weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, or asymptotically strategy-proof. We also revise proofs for the remaining properties.
Nguyen et al.（2016）引入了有限互补下的捆绑概率序列和捆绑概率序列机制，用于在顺序偏好下分配不可分割对象束。他们提出了两种机制的效率、公平和激励性质，证明了两种机制都是通常有效的、弱无嫉妒的、弱策略证明的和渐近策略证明的。我们提供了反例，证明了捆绑概率序列机制不是弱策略证明，有限互补机制下的捆绑概率序列不是弱无嫉妒、弱策略证明或渐近策略证明。我们还修改了其余性质的证明。
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引用次数: 0
The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union 这些冲击很重要：劳动力流动性和货币联盟的福利成本
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2025-12-29 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106132
Sihao Chen , David Cook , Haichao Fan , Juanyi Xu
In this paper, we study the impact of labor mobility on the welfare cost of a currency union in an open economy New Keynesian model. We find that the relationship between labor mobility and exchange rate flexibility depends on the source of asymmetric regional shocks. With demand shocks, labor mobility reduces the welfare cost of a union by reducing the cost of shifting labor to concentrated areas of high demand. With supply shocks, flexible exchange rates can work in conjunction with higher labor mobility to reallocate the factors of production to higher productivity regions of potential currency areas. Therefore, higher labor mobility can widen the welfare gap between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, implying areas with high inter-regional labor mobility may benefit more from exchange rate flexibility.
本文研究了开放经济新凯恩斯模型下劳动力流动对货币联盟福利成本的影响。研究发现，劳动力流动性与汇率弹性之间的关系取决于不对称区域冲击的来源。在需求冲击下，劳动力流动降低了劳动力向高需求集中地区转移的成本，从而降低了工会的福利成本。在供给冲击的情况下，灵活的汇率可以与更高的劳动力流动性相结合，将生产要素重新分配到潜在货币区生产率更高的地区。因此，较高的劳动力流动性会扩大固定汇率制度和灵活汇率制度之间的福利差距，这意味着区域间劳动力流动性高的地区可能从汇率灵活性中受益更多。
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引用次数: 0
Managing the expectations of buyers with reference-dependent preferences 管理具有参考依赖偏好的买家的期望
IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Journal of Economic Theory
Pub Date : 2025-12-25 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106134
Nathan Hancart
I consider a model of monopoly pricing where a firm makes a price offer to a buyer with reference-dependent preferences without being able to commit to it. The reference point is the ex-ante probability of trade and the buyer exhibits an attachment effect: the higher his expectations to buy, the higher his willingness-to-pay. When the buyer’s valuation is private information, a unique equilibrium exists where the firm plays a mixed strategy and its profits are the same as in the reference-independent benchmark. The equilibrium always entails inefficiencies: even as the firm’s information converges to complete information, it mixes on a non-vanishing support and the probability of no trade is greater than zero. Finally, I show that when the firm can design a test about the buyer’s valuation, it can do strictly better than in the reference-independent benchmark by leveraging the uncertainty generated by a noisy test.
我考虑了一个垄断定价模型，在这个模型中，一家公司向具有参考依赖偏好的买家提供价格，但却无法承诺。参考点为事前交易概率，买方表现出依恋效应：其购买期望越高，其支付意愿越高。当买方的估值是私有信息时，存在一个独特的均衡，即企业采取混合策略，其利润与参考独立基准下的利润相同。均衡总是伴随着低效率：即使公司的信息趋同于完全信息，它也混合在一个不消失的支持上，不交易的概率大于零。最后，我表明，当公司可以设计一个关于买方估值的测试时，它可以通过利用由噪声测试产生的不确定性来比参考独立基准做得更好。
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