Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

英文中文

Intertemporal bundling 跨时期的捆绑

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106127

Jingfeng Lu , Wenbo Zhao

This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, where two objects (A and B) are sequentially available for sale. When the buyer’s values of the two objects (v_A and v_B respectively) are independent, in contrast to conventional insight from simultaneous sales, we find in our setting that there is no loss in relying on separate sales for optimal design. This result extends under widely adopted regularity conditions when the values are positively correlated in the sense that v_B is stochastically increasing in v_A. However, if v_B is stochastically decreasing in v_A, separate sales are no longer optimal, and the optimal integrated design features intertemporal bundling. When it is always efficient to provide each good, the optimal selling mechanism is implemented by offering a menu of intertemporal bundles with different prices, where each bundle consists of the second object together with a probabilistic proportion of the first object. In particular, if the buyer’s virtual value of the first good is always non-negative, pure bundling becomes optimal.

本文研究了在两周期最优动态销售机制中，当两个对象（a和B）依次可供销售时，跨期捆绑何时以及如何产生。当买家对两个对象的价值（分别为vA和vB）是独立的，与同时销售的传统见解相反，我们发现在我们的设置中，依靠单独销售来实现最佳设计并没有损失。这一结果在广泛采用的正则性条件下得到推广，当vB在vA中随机增加时，当vB在vA中随机减少时，单独销售不再是最优的，最优的集成设计以跨期捆绑为特征。当提供每种商品总是有效时，最优销售机制是通过提供具有不同价格的跨期捆绑包菜单来实现的，其中每个捆绑包由第二种商品和第一种商品的概率比例组成。特别是，如果买方对第一件商品的虚拟价值总是非负的，那么纯捆绑就成为最优的。

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引用次数: 0

The multiple-volunteers principle 多志愿者原则

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106114

Susanne Goldlücke , Thomas Tröger

We present a class of simple transfer-free rules for assigning an unpleasant task among a group of agents: agents decide simultaneously whether or not to volunteer; if the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold number, the task is assigned to a volunteer; otherwise, the task is assigned to a non-volunteer. In particular, the rule may ask for multiple volunteers although one agent is sufficient to perform the task. In a setting in which agents care about who performs the task, any multiple-volunteers rule yields a strict interim Pareto improvement over random task assignment. Some volunteers rule is utilitarian optimal across all transfer-free binary mechanisms, and a rule with a large threshold reaches the first-best approximately if the group is large. Similar results hold for the problem of assigning a pleasant task. In that case, the task is assigned to a volunteer if and only if there are sufficiently few volunteers.

我们提出了一类简单的无转移规则，用于在一组智能体之间分配不愉快的任务：智能体同时决定是否自愿；如果志愿者人数超过阈值，则将任务分配给志愿者；否则，该任务将分配给非志愿者。特别是，该规则可能要求多个志愿者，尽管一个代理足以执行任务。在代理关心谁执行任务的情况下，任何多志愿者规则都比随机任务分配产生严格的临时帕累托改进。一些志愿者规则在所有无转移二元机制中都是功利最优的，当群体规模较大时，阈值较大的规则近似达到最优。类似的结果也适用于分配令人愉快的任务的问题。在这种情况下，当且仅当志愿者足够少时，将任务分配给志愿者。

引用次数: 0

Corrigendum to “Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture” [Journal of Economic Theory 185 (2020) 104951] “结构性群体偏好的进化：基因、枪支和文化”[j] .经济理论学报185(2020)104951。

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-12-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106110

Ingela Alger , Jörgen W. Weibull , Laurent Lehmann

引用次数: 0

Optimal screening with securities 证券最优筛选

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-30 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106125

Nicolas Figueroa , Nicolas Inostroza

A liquidity-constrained asset owner screens an informed investor using financial securities. Information-insensitive securities reduce the investor’s information rents. The optimal screening mechanism consists of a monotone debt menu where more optimistic investor types purchase larger amounts of debt. Interestingly, the issuer may benefit from trading with a better informed investor. For any monotone debt menu, as the asset’s cash flows more accurately describe the investor’s private information (Lehmann, 1988), the trade surplus unambiguously increases. Further, fixing the optimal debt menu, when the investor’s private information originates from location experiments, increasing accuracy decreases (increases) information rents for low (high) types. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee that the issuer strictly benefits from trading with a better informed investor. Our results imply that selling debt is an effective approach to raise funds in financial markets even when investors hold superior private information and provide a novel rationale for the emergence of venture debt.

流动性受限的资产所有者使用金融证券筛选知情的投资者。信息不敏感证券降低了投资者的信息租金。最优的筛选机制包括一个单调的债务菜单，更乐观的投资者类型购买更多的债务。有趣的是，发行人可能会从与更知情的投资者进行交易中受益。对于任何单调债务菜单，随着资产的现金流更准确地描述投资者的私人信息（Lehmann, 1988），贸易顺差无疑会增加。进一步，确定最优债务菜单，当投资者的私人信息来源于位置实验时，准确性的提高会降低（增加）低（高）类型的信息租金。我们提供充分的条件，保证发行人从与消息更灵通的投资者进行交易中严格获益。我们的研究结果表明，即使投资者拥有优越的私人信息，出售债务也是在金融市场上筹集资金的有效方法，并为风险债务的出现提供了新的理由。

引用次数: 0

Robust product design and pricing 稳健的产品设计和定价

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-19 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106112

Kyungmin Kim , Nenad Kos

We study design and pricing by a monopolist who has no information about the distribution of consumers’ tastes and maximizes her profit under the worst-case scenario. We show that her optimal strategy takes a simple form of dividing the taste space into a finite number of equal-length intervals and serving consumers on a randomly chosen interval. We obtain this result by studying the dual problem of finding a distribution of consumers’ tastes that minimizes the seller’s profit and establishing strong duality. The profit-minimizing distributions exhibit a uniformity property, assigning equal probability mass to a finite number of partition cells of equal width. Through the dual, we also determine the seller’s lowest profit in the Bayesian setting, establish that it is strictly positive, and derive the set of achievable profits.

我们研究垄断者的设计和定价，他不知道消费者的口味分布，并在最坏的情况下最大化她的利润。我们表明，她的最优策略采用了一种简单的形式，即将味觉空间划分为有限数量的等长间隔，并在随机选择的间隔上为消费者提供服务。我们通过研究寻找使卖方利润最小的消费者口味分布的对偶问题和建立强对偶性得到了这一结果。利润最小化分布表现出均匀性，为有限数量的等宽分区单元分配等概率质量。通过对偶，我们还确定了贝叶斯条件下卖方的最低利润，确定其为严格正的，并导出了可实现利润集。

引用次数: 0

Partially constructed sequential equilibrium 部分构造序贯均衡

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-15 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106111

Joel Watson

This article identifies sufficient conditions under which a partial construction of sequential equilibrium—characterizing beliefs and behavior for only a subset of the information sets—is sufficient for the existence of a sequential equilibrium that coincides with the partial construction in a suitable way. Illustrative applications are also presented.

本文确定了序列均衡的部分构造（仅表征信息集子集的信念和行为）足以使序列均衡以适当的方式与部分构造相吻合的充分条件。并给出了实例应用。

引用次数: 0

Welfare and distributional effects of joint intervention in networks 网络中联合干预的福利和分配效应

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-13 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106109

Ryan Kor , Yi Liu , Yves Zenou , Junjie Zhou

We study the optimal joint intervention of a planner who can influence both the standalone marginal utilities of agents in a network and the weights of the links connecting them. The welfare-maximizing intervention displays two key features. First, when the planner’s budget is moderate (yielding interior solutions), the optimal change in link weight between any pair of agents is proportional to the product of their eigen-centralities. Second, when the budget is sufficiently large, the optimal network converges to a simple structure: a complete network under strategic complements, or a complete balanced bipartite network under strategic substitutes. We show that welfare effects are governed by the principal eigenvalue of the network, while distributional outcomes are driven by the dispersion of the corresponding eigen-centralities. Comparing joint interventions to single interventions targeting only standalone marginal utilities, we find that joint interventions consistently generate higher aggregate welfare, but may also increase inequality, revealing a potential trade-off between efficiency and equity.

我们研究了一个规划者的最优联合干预，它既可以影响网络中个体的独立边际效用，也可以影响连接它们的链路的权重。福利最大化干预表现出两个关键特征。首先，当规划者的预算是适度的（产生内部解决方案），任何一对代理之间的连接权的最优变化与它们的特征中心性的乘积成正比。第二，当预算足够大时，最优网络收敛于一个简单的结构：战略互补下的完全网络，或战略替代下的完全平衡二部网络。研究表明，福利效应由网络的主特征值控制，而分配结果则由相应特征中心性的分散驱动。将联合干预与仅针对独立边际效用的单一干预进行比较，我们发现联合干预始终产生更高的总福利，但也可能增加不平等，揭示了效率与公平之间的潜在权衡。

引用次数: 0

Higher-order forward guidance 高阶前向制导

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106108

Marc Dordal i Carreras , Seung Joo Lee

This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a trade-off between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabilization uncertain strictly dominates other forward-guidance strategies.

本文建立了一个具有内生性波动率为零下限（ZLB）和央行前瞻指引的经济周期模型。我们提供了三个主要结果。首先，对未来稳定的可信承诺抑制了ZLB的过度波动。其次，承诺以后不稳定可以使经济转向更有利的均衡路径，从而暴露出未来稳定与降低ZLB总波动性之间的权衡。第三，保持未来稳定时间的不确定性严格支配着其他前瞻性指导策略。

引用次数: 0

On the timing of moves in two-player games 在双人游戏中移动的时机

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106107

Larry Karp , Robert C. Schmidt , Leo Simon , Leanne Streekstra

We introduce a novel continuous-time framework for analyzing two-player games. Each player can move at most once, choosing an action along with its timing. We introduce assumptions that allow for a natural representation of such games, and establish results on the relation between discrete and continuous time. Unlike in Simon and Stinchcombe [1989], action sets are compact subsets of

R^{n}

(rather than finite). This substantially increases the scope for applications. For illustration, we analyze different variants of price competition with entry in continuous time. Our framework handles complexities such as discontinuous changes in prices, and allows us to predict the identity of the price leader with minimal calculation. We show that it depends on product differentiation and on the possibility to deter entry.

我们引入了一个新的连续时间框架来分析二人博弈。每个玩家最多只能移动一次，选择一个行动和它的时间。我们引入了允许这种博弈的自然表示的假设，并建立了离散时间和连续时间之间关系的结果。与Simon和Stinchcombe[1989]不同，动作集是Rn的紧子集（而不是有限子集）。这大大增加了应用程序的范围。为了说明问题，我们分析了连续时间内价格竞争的不同变体。我们的框架处理诸如价格不连续变化之类的复杂性，并允许我们以最少的计算来预测价格领导者的身份。我们表明，这取决于产品差异化和阻止进入的可能性。

引用次数: 0

Endogenous business cycles in overlapping generations models with time inconsistency 具有时间不一致性的重叠代模型中的内生商业周期

IF 1.2 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Theory

Pub Date : 2025-11-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106104

Eungsik Kim, Jiayi Li

This paper investigates the implications of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences and extending the economic lifespan for the emergence of endogenous business cycles. Using a three-period overlapping generations model, we examine how quasi-hyperbolic discounting influences the dynamics of deterministic cycles and local sunspot equilibria. The presence of a middle-aged generation plays a key role in generating an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that is lower than the inverse of risk aversion, interacting with consumers’ time-inconsistent behavior. A lower EIS strengthens gross complementarity between dated goods and thereby contributes to the existence of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling, belief-driven fluctuations. We show that our three-period model with time-inconsistent preferences makes two-period cycles and local indeterminacy more plausible than in a standard two-period framework with exponential discounting, as it expands the set of parameter values under which such endogenous fluctuations can arise.

本文探讨了纳入准双曲贴现偏好和延长经济寿命对内生经济周期出现的影响。利用三周期重叠代模型，我们研究了准双曲折现如何影响确定性周期和局部太阳黑子平衡的动力学。中年一代的存在与消费者的时间不一致行为相互作用，在产生低于风险厌恶逆的跨期替代弹性方面发挥了关键作用。较低的环境影响指标加强了过时商品之间的总互补性，从而导致多重平衡和自我实现、信念驱动的波动的存在。我们表明，我们的具有时间不一致偏好的三期模型使两期周期和局部不确定性比具有指数贴现的标准两期框架更合理，因为它扩展了可能产生这种内生波动的参数值集。

引用次数: 0

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