Drivers of local government borrowing in China: Fiscal hunger and competition game under asymmetric decentralization

This paper contributes two mechanisms through which asymmetric fiscal decentralization drives local government borrowing: ‘fiscal hunger’ (borrowing to address budgetary fiscal gaps, leverage land resources, and pay off existing loans) and ‘competition game’ (borrowing to compete for bond issuance and state funds). Analyzing a dataset of 290 Chinese cities from 2006 to 2015, we find local government borrowing is driven by both fiscal hunger and inter-city competition. Borrowing is not confined to the growth-oriented purpose. Our Geographically Weighted Panel Regression uncovers the spatial patterns of two borrowing mechanisms, in which borrowing in less-developed regions is predominantly driven by fiscal hunger, while developed coastal regions actively engage in inter-city competition through borrowing. These dynamics may aggravate fiscal disparities among Chinese cities.