强制披露登记赎回的开放式房地产基金份额?

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS International Review of Law and Economics Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI:10.1016/j.irle.2024.106229
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引用次数: 0

摘要

投资于长期资产的开放式基金面临着持续的流动性转换风险,这可能导致金融不稳定。针对开放式房地产基金的流动性危机,德国立法者出台了强制性最低持有期和通知期,分别为 24 个月和 12 个月。自新法规于 2013 年 7 月颁布以来,德国开放式房地产基金的管理公司已收到有关份额赎回预期现金流出的详细信息。本文探讨了是否应披露登记赎回股份数量的问题。对德国基金会计法律法规的目的论分析表明,目前的不披露与提供决策有用信息的既定目标之间存在不匹配。然而,必须在投资者对信息的需求与自我强化恐慌效应的风险之间做出权衡,本文使用基于代理的模型对这一问题进行了研究。利用基金历史数据对模型进行参数化,结果表明,信息披露会增加暂停赎回的概率,但这种暂停赎回会更及时地发生;因此,会有更少的投资者被困在不得不暂停赎回份额的基金中。此外,这种披露不仅会将风险从不知情的、有生命周期的、储蓄型投资者转移到成熟的投资者身上,而且会将投资收益从成熟的投资者转移到储蓄型投资者身上。因此,这种信息披露将构成 Georgakopoulos(1996,2017)所说的对知情交易者的信息披露补贴的反面,即由知情投资者承担对不知情投资者的信息披露补贴。然而,本文中的模型与 Georgakopoulos(1996,2017)中概述的模型有所不同,因为它没有建立噪音交易者的模型。本文提供的框架也与英国的立法机构及其最近创立的长期资产基金类别相关。
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Mandatory disclosure of open-ended real estate fund shares that are registered for redemption?
Open-ended funds that invest in long-term assets face constant liquidity transformation risk, which can lead to financial instability. German lawmakers have responded to the liquidity crisis of open-ended real estate funds by introducing mandatory minimum holding and notice periods of 24 and 12 months, respectively. Since the new regulations were enacted in July 2013, the management companies of German open-ended real estate funds have received detailed information on the expected cash outflows from share redemptions. This article explores the question of whether the number of shares registered for redemption should be disclosed. A teleological analysis of German fund accounting law and regulation reveals a mismatch between the current nondisclosure and the stated objective to provide decision-useful information. However, a trade-off must be made between investors’ need for information and the risk of self-reinforcing panic effects, which is investigated using agent-based modeling. Parameterizing the model with historical fund data shows that disclosure would increase the probability of a redemption suspension but that such suspensions would occur timelier; thus, fewer investors would be trapped in a fund that has to suspend the redemption of shares. In addition, such disclosure would shift not only risk from uninformed, life-cycle, saving investors to sophisticated investors but also investment returns from sophisticated investors to saving investors. Such disclosure would thus constitute the opposite of what Georgakopoulos (1996, 2017) calls a disclosure subsidy for informed traders, i.e., a disclosure subsidy for uninformed investors that is borne by informed investors. However, the model in this article is distinguishable from the one outlined in Georgakopoulos (1996, 2017) because it does not model noise traders. The framework provided in this article is also relevant to the legislature in the United Kingdom and its recently created fund category of long-term asset funds.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
18.20%
发文量
38
审稿时长
48 days
期刊介绍: The International Review of Law and Economics provides a forum for interdisciplinary research at the interface of law and economics. IRLE is international in scope and audience and particularly welcomes both theoretical and empirical papers on comparative law and economics, globalization and legal harmonization, and the endogenous emergence of legal institutions, in addition to more traditional legal topics.
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