推荐信是制度化的流言蜚语:中介中的纽带强度和宣传与准确性的权衡

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Pub Date : 2024-10-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104685
Britt Hadar , Nir Halevy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

流言蜚语既常见又影响深远。人们经常在他人不在场的情况下分享他人的名誉信息,这种无处不在的做法有力地塑造了流言的发送者、接收者和目标之间的印象、互动和关系。本文探讨了流言文献中的两个悬而未决的问题:发送者何时、为何要分享不准确的信息,接收者在多大程度上依赖这些信息?我们将推荐信(LORs)概念化为制度化的流言,并在劳动力市场的背景下研究这些问题,在劳动力市场中,发送者选择为求职者宣传的程度,而接收者则决定是否雇用他们。我们提出,LORs 的发送者会根据他们与推荐对象和接收者之间的联系强度来平衡推荐的积极性和准确性。具体来说,我们预测,当发送者与求职对象的联系较强而与接收者的联系较弱时,他们会优先考虑宣传而不是准确性;而当发送者与求职对象的联系较弱而与接收者的联系较强时,他们会优先考虑准确性而不是宣传。我们报告了两个大型实验的结果,在这两个实验中,我们系统地操纵了发送者与目标和接收者的联系强度。在实验 1 中,参与者在我们设计的一个新颖的经济游戏中做出决策,以捕捉准确性与倡导性之间的权衡。在实验 2a 和 2b 中,参与者分别扮演 LOR 的发送者和接收者。这些实验表明,发送者与他人联系的强弱会影响其通信的(不)准确性,而接收者则倾向于信任向其传达的信息。
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Letters of recommendation as institutionalized gossip: Tie strength and the advocacy-accuracy tradeoff in brokering
Gossip is both common and consequential. People often share reputational information about others in their absence, and this ubiquitous practice powerfully shapes impressions, interactions, and relationships among senders, receivers, and the targets of gossip. This paper addresses two open questions in the gossip literature: When and why do senders share inaccurate information, and to what extent do receivers rely on such information? We conceptualize letters of recommendation (LORs) as institutionalized gossip and study these questions in the context of labor markets, where senders choose how much to advocate for a job candidate and receivers decide whether to hire them. We propose that senders of LORs balance advocacy and accuracy based on the strength of their ties with the target and the receiver. Specifically, we predict that senders prioritize advocacy over accuracy when they are strongly connected to the target and weakly connected to the receiver; yet prioritize accuracy over advocacy when they are weakly connected to the target and strongly connected to the receiver. We report findings from two large experiments wherein we systematically manipulated the sender's tie strength with both the target and the receiver. In Experiment 1, participants made decisions within a novel economic game we devised to capture the accuracy-advocacy tradeoff. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants assumed the roles of senders and receivers of LORs, respectively. These experiments show that the strength of senders' ties to others shape the (in)accuracy of their communications and that receivers tend to trust the information conveyed to them.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
期刊最新文献
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