{"title":"国际边界上的上市公司:空间价格歧视模型","authors":"John S. Heywood , Zheng Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2024.104054","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper uniquely examines an international mixed oligopoly in a model of spatial price discrimination. It isolates the importance of the location of the border showing a variety of equilibria depending on the nationality and placement of the private rivals. While the presence of a public firm often improves domestic welfare, it need not. Moreover, a prisoner's dilemma can exist in which each country would benefit from the privatization of both public firms but neither country has a unilateral incentive to privatize. The implications are discussed.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48196,"journal":{"name":"Regional Science and Urban Economics","volume":"109 ","pages":"Article 104054"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Public firms on an international border: A model of spatial price discrimination\",\"authors\":\"John S. Heywood , Zheng Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2024.104054\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>This paper uniquely examines an international mixed oligopoly in a model of spatial price discrimination. It isolates the importance of the location of the border showing a variety of equilibria depending on the nationality and placement of the private rivals. While the presence of a public firm often improves domestic welfare, it need not. Moreover, a prisoner's dilemma can exist in which each country would benefit from the privatization of both public firms but neither country has a unilateral incentive to privatize. The implications are discussed.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48196,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Regional Science and Urban Economics\",\"volume\":\"109 \",\"pages\":\"Article 104054\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-10-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Regional Science and Urban Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166046224000851\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Regional Science and Urban Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166046224000851","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Public firms on an international border: A model of spatial price discrimination
This paper uniquely examines an international mixed oligopoly in a model of spatial price discrimination. It isolates the importance of the location of the border showing a variety of equilibria depending on the nationality and placement of the private rivals. While the presence of a public firm often improves domestic welfare, it need not. Moreover, a prisoner's dilemma can exist in which each country would benefit from the privatization of both public firms but neither country has a unilateral incentive to privatize. The implications are discussed.
期刊介绍:
Regional Science and Urban Economics facilitates and encourages high-quality scholarship on important issues in regional and urban economics. It publishes significant contributions that are theoretical or empirical, positive or normative. It solicits original papers with a spatial dimension that can be of interest to economists. Empirical papers studying causal mechanisms are expected to propose a convincing identification strategy.