采购互动中的或有支付:实验证据

IF 2.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS European Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104886
Jason Shachat , Matthew J. Walker , Lijia Wei
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在供应商之间形成竞争的一个主要目的是以较低的价格采购到较高质量的货物和服务。在采购非标准货物时,往往很难在合同中对所需质量作出完整的规定。因此,支付给供应商的款项不可能完全取决于所提供的质量。我们建立了一个简单的模型来提炼现实世界中的几个特征,并说明价格优先竞争中的合同结构如何共同影响投标攻击性和提供盈余增强质量的激励机制。我们以概率的方式实现或有付款。根据固定的概率,被选中的供应商的付款要么是其出价,要么是取决于出价和分配社会剩余的外生规范的质量或有金额。我们利用实验室实验证明,在高质量的 "金发区",质量或有付款的概率大到足以激励供应,但又不会大到诱导过于激进的竞标。这种实施只依赖于自身利益最大化的偏好和逆向归纳的合理性。一个在我们的设定中没有预测到的实验结果是,供应商在 "金发姑娘 "区域内获得了正经济利润,这可以用供应商的风险规避来解释。这些结果对合同中或有付款的有效设计具有启示意义。
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Contingent payments in procurement interactions: Experimental evidence
A primary objective of creating competition among suppliers is the procurement of higher quality goods and services at lower prices. When procuring non-standard goods, it is often difficult to write a complete specification of desired quality in the contract. Thus, payments to suppliers cannot be perfectly conditioned on the quality provided. We develop a simple model to distil several real-world features and illustrate how contract structure within price priority competition jointly affects bid aggression and incentives for the provision of surplus-enhancing quality. We implement the contingent payments as probabilistic. The selected supplier’s payment is, according to a fixed probability, either their bid or a quality contingent amount that depends on the bid and an exogenous norm for allocating social surplus. We use a lab experiment to show that there is a ‘Goldilocks’ region for high quality in which the probability of quality contingent payment is large enough to incentivize provision, but not so large as to induce overly aggressive bidding. This implementation only relies upon preferences for maximizing one’s own profit and the rationality of backward induction. An experimental finding not predicted in our setting is that suppliers earn positive economic profits inside the Goldilocks region, which can be explained by suppliers’ risk aversion. The results have implications for the effective design of contingent payments in contracts.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.70
自引率
3.60%
发文量
170
期刊介绍: The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.
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