{"title":"非国有股东任命的董事与股价同步性：中国国有企业的证据","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.mulfin.2024.100884","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do non-state shareholders who are given more boardroom \"voice\" inhibit stock price synchronicity? Utilizing panel data for Chinese enterprises spanning 2007–2021, we explore the impact of directors appointed by foreign shareholders and non-foreign shareholders on stock price synchronicity. Our findings indicate that directors appointed by non-state shareholders are negatively related to stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert more effective governance effects and reduce stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert a more effective information effect, resulting in lower share price synchronicity. Heterogeneous analyses reveal that this impact is more pronounced in non-multinational enterprises, and enterprises with foreign directors. Furthermore, directors appointed by non-state shareholders reduce stock price synchronicity mainly through the information effect.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47268,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Multinational Financial Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Directors appointed by non-state shareholders and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from Chinese SOEs\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.mulfin.2024.100884\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Do non-state shareholders who are given more boardroom \\\"voice\\\" inhibit stock price synchronicity? Utilizing panel data for Chinese enterprises spanning 2007–2021, we explore the impact of directors appointed by foreign shareholders and non-foreign shareholders on stock price synchronicity. Our findings indicate that directors appointed by non-state shareholders are negatively related to stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert more effective governance effects and reduce stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert a more effective information effect, resulting in lower share price synchronicity. Heterogeneous analyses reveal that this impact is more pronounced in non-multinational enterprises, and enterprises with foreign directors. Furthermore, directors appointed by non-state shareholders reduce stock price synchronicity mainly through the information effect.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47268,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Multinational Financial Management\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Multinational Financial Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042444X24000495\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Multinational Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042444X24000495","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Directors appointed by non-state shareholders and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from Chinese SOEs
Do non-state shareholders who are given more boardroom "voice" inhibit stock price synchronicity? Utilizing panel data for Chinese enterprises spanning 2007–2021, we explore the impact of directors appointed by foreign shareholders and non-foreign shareholders on stock price synchronicity. Our findings indicate that directors appointed by non-state shareholders are negatively related to stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert more effective governance effects and reduce stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert a more effective information effect, resulting in lower share price synchronicity. Heterogeneous analyses reveal that this impact is more pronounced in non-multinational enterprises, and enterprises with foreign directors. Furthermore, directors appointed by non-state shareholders reduce stock price synchronicity mainly through the information effect.
期刊介绍：
International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.
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