非国有股东任命的董事与股价同步性：中国国有企业的证据

IF 2.9 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Multinational Financial Management Pub Date : 2024-11-02 DOI:10.1016/j.mulfin.2024.100884

Zongtao Tian, Zhibin Chen, Xinxue Chang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

获得更多董事会 "话语权 "的非国有股东是否会抑制股价同步性？利用 2007-2021 年中国企业的面板数据，我们探讨了外资股东和非外资股东委派董事对股价同步性的影响。我们的研究结果表明，非国有股东委派的董事与股价同步性负相关。与非外资股东任命的董事相比，外资股东任命的董事能发挥更有效的治理效果，降低股价同步性。与非外资股东任命的董事相比，外资股东任命的董事能发挥更有效的信息效应，从而降低股价同步性。异质性分析表明，这种影响在非跨国企业和有外籍董事的企业中更为明显。此外，非国有股东任命的董事主要通过信息效应降低股价同步性。

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Directors appointed by non-state shareholders and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from Chinese SOEs

Do non-state shareholders who are given more boardroom "voice" inhibit stock price synchronicity? Utilizing panel data for Chinese enterprises spanning 2007–2021, we explore the impact of directors appointed by foreign shareholders and non-foreign shareholders on stock price synchronicity. Our findings indicate that directors appointed by non-state shareholders are negatively related to stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert more effective governance effects and reduce stock price synchronicity. Compared with directors appointed by non-foreign shareholders, directors appointed by foreign shareholders exert a more effective information effect, resulting in lower share price synchronicity. Heterogeneous analyses reveal that this impact is more pronounced in non-multinational enterprises, and enterprises with foreign directors. Furthermore, directors appointed by non-state shareholders reduce stock price synchronicity mainly through the information effect.

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来源期刊

Journal of Multinational Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

7.30

自引率

4.80%

发文量

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： International trade, financing and investments have grown at an extremely rapid pace in recent years, and the operations of corporations have become increasingly multinationalized. Corporate executives buying and selling goods and services, and making financing and investment decisions across national boundaries, have developed policies and procedures for managing cash flows denominated in foreign currencies. These policies and procedures, and the related managerial actions of executives, change as new relevant information becomes available. The purpose of the Journal of Multinational Financial Management is to publish rigorous, original articles dealing with the management of the multinational enterprise. Theoretical, conceptual, and empirical papers providing meaningful insights into the subject areas will be considered. The following topic areas, although not exhaustive, are representative of the coverage in this Journal. • Foreign exchange risk management • International capital budgeting • Forecasting exchange rates • Foreign direct investment • Hedging strategies • Cost of capital • Managing transaction exposure • Political risk assessment • International working capital management • International financial planning • International tax management • International diversification • Transfer pricing strategies • International liability management • International mergers.

期刊最新文献

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