{"title":"KAMs 的模板减少是否意味着审计工作的增加?来自中国的证据","authors":"Qianqun Ma , Qi Wang , Kongwen Wang , Chong Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.iref.2024.103697","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>By examining the effects of media coverage and legal environment and the modifying effect of auditors' market shares, this paper investigates whether reduced boilerplate of key audit matters (KAMs) reflects increased audit effort. Our findings indicate that auditors can change boilerplate of KAMs according to the tone of media coverage: auditors may reduce boilerplate of KAMs when firms are exposed to more negative media coverage and may increase boilerplate of KAMs when firms are exposed to more positive media coverage. Auditors of firms that are exposed to weaker legal environment reduce boilerplate of KAMs. Boilerplate of KAMs disclosed by audit firms with larger market shares is more significantly influenced by negative media coverage and legal environment than those with smaller market shares. Additionally, the effects of media coverage and legal environment on boilerplate of KAMs are only significant for the sub-samples with non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and higher information symmetry. These results prove that reduced boilerplate of KAMs reflects increased audit effort.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":14444,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Economics & Finance","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 103697"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does reduced boilerplate of KAMs indicate increased audit effort? Evidence from China\",\"authors\":\"Qianqun Ma , Qi Wang , Kongwen Wang , Chong Wu\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.iref.2024.103697\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>By examining the effects of media coverage and legal environment and the modifying effect of auditors' market shares, this paper investigates whether reduced boilerplate of key audit matters (KAMs) reflects increased audit effort. Our findings indicate that auditors can change boilerplate of KAMs according to the tone of media coverage: auditors may reduce boilerplate of KAMs when firms are exposed to more negative media coverage and may increase boilerplate of KAMs when firms are exposed to more positive media coverage. Auditors of firms that are exposed to weaker legal environment reduce boilerplate of KAMs. Boilerplate of KAMs disclosed by audit firms with larger market shares is more significantly influenced by negative media coverage and legal environment than those with smaller market shares. Additionally, the effects of media coverage and legal environment on boilerplate of KAMs are only significant for the sub-samples with non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and higher information symmetry. These results prove that reduced boilerplate of KAMs reflects increased audit effort.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14444,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Economics & Finance\",\"volume\":\"96 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103697\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Economics & Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056024006890\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Economics & Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056024006890","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
通过研究媒体报道和法律环境的影响以及审计师市场份额的调节作用,本文探讨了关键审计事项(KAMs)模板的减少是否反映了审计工作的增加。我们的研究结果表明,审计师可以根据媒体报道的基调改变关键审计事项的模板:当公司受到更多负面媒体报道时,审计师可能会减少关键审计事项的模板;当公司受到更多正面媒体报道时,审计师可能会增加关键审计事项的模板。法律环境较弱的公司的审计师会减少 KAMs 的模板。与市场份额较小的公司相比,市场份额较大的审计公司披露的关键审计变量的模板受负面媒体报道和法律环境的影响更大。此外,媒体报道和法律环境对 KAMs 模板的影响仅在非国有企业和信息对称性较高的子样本中显著。这些结果证明,减少 KAM 的模板反映了审计工作的增加。
Does reduced boilerplate of KAMs indicate increased audit effort? Evidence from China
By examining the effects of media coverage and legal environment and the modifying effect of auditors' market shares, this paper investigates whether reduced boilerplate of key audit matters (KAMs) reflects increased audit effort. Our findings indicate that auditors can change boilerplate of KAMs according to the tone of media coverage: auditors may reduce boilerplate of KAMs when firms are exposed to more negative media coverage and may increase boilerplate of KAMs when firms are exposed to more positive media coverage. Auditors of firms that are exposed to weaker legal environment reduce boilerplate of KAMs. Boilerplate of KAMs disclosed by audit firms with larger market shares is more significantly influenced by negative media coverage and legal environment than those with smaller market shares. Additionally, the effects of media coverage and legal environment on boilerplate of KAMs are only significant for the sub-samples with non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and higher information symmetry. These results prove that reduced boilerplate of KAMs reflects increased audit effort.
期刊介绍:
The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.