什么是合理怀疑？为索萨 "认识论解释 "哲学研究特刊撰稿

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-08 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02247-y

Lilith Mace, Mona Simion

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文对准确怀疑和合理怀疑进行了新颖的阐释和辩护。我们从索萨的目的论认识论规范图式中汲取灵感，认为一个人对 p 的准确性的怀疑程度只是在它与相信 p 所涉及的可验证风险水平相匹配的情况下。

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What is reasonable doubt? For philosophical studies special issue on Sosa’s ‘epistemic explanations’

This paper develops and defends novel accounts of accurate and reasonable doubt. We take a cue from Sosa's telic epistemic normative picture to argue that one’s degree of doubt that p is accurate just in case it matches the level of veritic risk involved in believing that p. In turn, on this account, reasonable doubt is doubt that is generated by a properly functioning cognitive capacity with the function of encoding veritic risk.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

127

期刊介绍： Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.

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