什么是理性感伤主义？

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-11-13 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02235-2

Selim Berker

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引用次数: 0

摘要

这篇关于贾斯汀-德阿姆斯和丹尼尔-雅各布森的《理性情感主义》的评论探讨了两个关键问题：德阿姆斯和雅各布森称之为 "理性情感主义 "的立场究竟是什么？达姆斯和雅各布森声称，恐惧、自豪和娱乐等情绪的适宜性条件不存在 "与反应无关 "的解释，这对他们的观点提出了挑战。

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What Is Rational Sentimentalism?

This commentary on Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s Rational Sentimentalism explores two key issues: what exactly is the position D’Arms and Jacobson call ‘rational sentimentalism’, and why exactly do they restrict their theorizing to the normative categories they dub ‘the sentimentalist values’? Along the way, a challenge is developed for D’Arms and Jacobson’s claim that there is no “response-independent” account of the fittingness conditions for emotions such as fear, pride, and amusement.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

127

期刊介绍： Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.

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