股价暴跌的教训:管理者信心和激励机制的变化

Hyeong Joon Kim
{"title":"股价暴跌的教训:管理者信心和激励机制的变化","authors":"Hyeong Joon Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the consequences of stock price crashes. I find that stock price crash risk subsequently reduces managerial confidence levels, as proxied by the CEO's option-based and earnings call transcript's text-based measures. I also find that stock price crash risk reduces CEO compensation and equity incentives, suggesting that a firm seeks to adjust managerial incentives after its stock price crashes to prevent future occurrences. Furthermore, CEOs with high confidence are more likely to curtail overinvestment after their crash experiences relative to others, thereby contributing to shareholder value. Overall, this paper provides novel evidence that CEOs and firms appear to learn from their experiences of stock price crashes, suggesting that stock price crashes may induce experience-driven conservatism that influences CEO and corporate decisions.","PeriodicalId":501001,"journal":{"name":"The British Accounting Review","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Lesson from stock price crash: Changes in managerial confidence and incentives\",\"authors\":\"Hyeong Joon Kim\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper investigates the consequences of stock price crashes. I find that stock price crash risk subsequently reduces managerial confidence levels, as proxied by the CEO's option-based and earnings call transcript's text-based measures. I also find that stock price crash risk reduces CEO compensation and equity incentives, suggesting that a firm seeks to adjust managerial incentives after its stock price crashes to prevent future occurrences. Furthermore, CEOs with high confidence are more likely to curtail overinvestment after their crash experiences relative to others, thereby contributing to shareholder value. Overall, this paper provides novel evidence that CEOs and firms appear to learn from their experiences of stock price crashes, suggesting that stock price crashes may induce experience-driven conservatism that influences CEO and corporate decisions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501001,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The British Accounting Review\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-10-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The British Accounting Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The British Accounting Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了股价暴跌的后果。我发现,股价暴跌风险会降低管理者的信心水平,这可以用首席执行官的期权和财报电话记录的文本衡量标准来表示。我还发现,股价暴跌风险会降低首席执行官的薪酬和股权激励,这表明公司会在股价暴跌后调整管理层的激励机制,以防止未来再次发生股价暴跌。此外,与其他人相比,高信心的首席执行官在经历股价暴跌后更有可能减少过度投资,从而提升股东价值。总之,本文提供了新的证据,证明首席执行官和公司似乎会从股价暴跌的经历中吸取教训,这表明股价暴跌可能会诱发经验驱动的保守主义,从而影响首席执行官和公司的决策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Lesson from stock price crash: Changes in managerial confidence and incentives
This paper investigates the consequences of stock price crashes. I find that stock price crash risk subsequently reduces managerial confidence levels, as proxied by the CEO's option-based and earnings call transcript's text-based measures. I also find that stock price crash risk reduces CEO compensation and equity incentives, suggesting that a firm seeks to adjust managerial incentives after its stock price crashes to prevent future occurrences. Furthermore, CEOs with high confidence are more likely to curtail overinvestment after their crash experiences relative to others, thereby contributing to shareholder value. Overall, this paper provides novel evidence that CEOs and firms appear to learn from their experiences of stock price crashes, suggesting that stock price crashes may induce experience-driven conservatism that influences CEO and corporate decisions.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
On the dynamics of treasury bond yields: From term structure modelling to economic scenario generation Labor litigation and corporate cash holdings: Insights from the textual analysis of judicial documents Bankruptcy forecasting — Market information with ensemble model Earnings management in local government healthcare reporting: Financial distress vs. peer influence? Does more effective director monitoring make management guidance more credible?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1