收购者关心信用评级的后果吗?来自信用评级观察的证据

Florian Kiesel, Kevin Riehl
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了企业收购公告和信用评级机构的反馈,即把收购方的发行人评级置于正式审查之下,以防发生变化。我们的研究表明,如果公司的评级被置于降级审查中,收购被撤回的可能性会增加 42.8%。从已完成的收购来看,与评级下调审查相关的交易需要多花费约 40% 的时间才能完成,收购方在第一年被下调评级的可能性是前者的两倍(13.4% 对 25.2%)。股票市场会考虑收购方降级的概率,因为降级风险增加的交易显示出较低的异常公告回报。我们没有发现企业预期评级机构审查的证据。
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Do acquirers care about credit rating consequences? Evidence from credit rating watches
We analyze corporate acquisition announcements and the feedback of credit rating agencies by placing the acquirer’s issuer rating under formal review for a potential change. We show that acquisitions are 42.8% more likely to be withdrawn if the firm’s rating is placed on review for downgrade. Focusing on completed acquisitions, deals associated with reviews for downgrade need approximately 40% more time to be completed, and acquirers are twice as likely to be downgraded in the first year (13.4% versus 25.2%). The stock market considers the probability of an acquirer’s downgrade as deals with increased downgrade risk show lower abnormal announcement returns. We do not find evidence that reviews of rating agencies are anticipated by firms.
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