监管和监督的独立性会影响金融稳定吗？

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-26 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107318

Nicolò Fraccaroli , Rhiannon Sowerbutts , Andrew Whitworth

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引用次数: 0

摘要

自 2008 年金融危机以来，监管机构和监督人员越来越独立于政治机构。但是，并没有明确的证据表明提高独立性对银行业的稳定性有好处。在本文中，我们引入了一个新的监管和监督独立性指标，该指标涵盖了从 1999 年到 2019 年的 98 个国家。我们将这一指标与银行层面的数据相结合，研究独立性与金融稳定性之间的关系。我们发现，更大的监管和监督独立性与更好的金融稳定性相关。我们表明，这些结果对其他金融稳定性衡量标准和一系列测试都是稳健的。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，提高监管机构和监督者的独立性有利于金融稳定。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?

Since the 2008 financial crisis, regulators and supervisors have been granted increased independence from political bodies. But there is no clear evidence of the benefits of more independence for the stability of the banking sector. In this paper we introduce a new indicator of regulatory and supervisory independence for 98 countries from 1999 to 2019. We combine this index with bank-level data to investigate the relationship between independence and financial stability. We find that greater regulatory and supervisory independence is associated with improved financial stability. We show that these results are robust to alternative measures of financial stability and to a number of tests. Overall, our findings indicate that increasing the independence of regulators and supervisors is beneficial for financial stability.

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.

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