没有垃圾的基本论点

IF 0.4 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY METAPHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI:10.1111/meta.12703
Joe Milburn
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引用次数: 0

摘要

里克-皮尔斯(2017)的 "基本论证 "是反对认识论科学主义的重要论据。基本论证的关键前提是,如果非科学的信仰来源不能为我们提供知识,那么科学也不能。但是,科学确实为我们提供了知识。因此,认识论科学主义是错误的。本文针对最近的批评为皮尔斯的论点进行了辩护。尤其是,希塔宁及其同事批评皮尔斯的论点建立在他们所谓的 "垃圾进,垃圾出 "原则(GIGO)之上。本文加强了他们对 GIGO 原则的攻击。然而,本文表明,我们并不需要 GIGO 原则来激发基本论证的关键前提。相反,本文认为关键前提是真实的,理由如下:科学知识是成功探究的结果;在某些时候,我们缺乏科学知识;没有一些先验知识,我们就无法成功探究。
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The Fundamental Argument without any garbage

Rik Peels's (2017) Fundamental Argument is an important argument against epistemic scientism. The crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument is that if nonscientific sources of belief did not provide us with knowledge, neither could the sciences. But, the sciences do provide us with knowledge. Thus, epistemic scientism is false. This paper defends Peels's argument against recent criticisms. In particular, Hietanen and colleagues criticize Peels's argument for resting on what they call the “garbage in, garbage out” principle (GIGO). This paper strengthens their attacks on the GIGO principle. It shows, however, that we don't need the GIGO principle to motivate the crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument. Instead, it argues that the crucial premise is true for the following reasons: scientific knowledge is the result of successful inquiry; at some point we lacked scientific knowledge; and, we cannot successfully inquire without some prior knowledge.

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来源期刊
METAPHILOSOPHY
METAPHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information The purpose of metaphysics: Apology of excess Moral testimony and epistemic privilege The poverty of postmodernist constructivism: And a case for naturalism out of Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein Virtuous leadership: Ambiguities, challenges, and precedents
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