{"title":"没有垃圾的基本论点","authors":"Joe Milburn","doi":"10.1111/meta.12703","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Rik Peels's (2017) Fundamental Argument is an important argument against epistemic scientism. The crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument is that if nonscientific sources of belief did not provide us with knowledge, neither could the sciences. But, the sciences <i>do</i> provide us with knowledge. Thus, epistemic scientism is false. This paper defends Peels's argument against recent criticisms. In particular, Hietanen and colleagues criticize Peels's argument for resting on what they call the “garbage in, garbage out” principle (GIGO). This paper strengthens their attacks on the GIGO principle. It shows, however, that we don't need the GIGO principle to motivate the crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument. Instead, it argues that the crucial premise is true for the following reasons: scientific knowledge is the result of successful inquiry; at some point we lacked scientific knowledge; and, we cannot successfully inquire without some prior knowledge.</p>","PeriodicalId":46874,"journal":{"name":"METAPHILOSOPHY","volume":"55 4-5","pages":"535-546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12703","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Fundamental Argument without any garbage\",\"authors\":\"Joe Milburn\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/meta.12703\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Rik Peels's (2017) Fundamental Argument is an important argument against epistemic scientism. The crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument is that if nonscientific sources of belief did not provide us with knowledge, neither could the sciences. But, the sciences <i>do</i> provide us with knowledge. Thus, epistemic scientism is false. This paper defends Peels's argument against recent criticisms. In particular, Hietanen and colleagues criticize Peels's argument for resting on what they call the “garbage in, garbage out” principle (GIGO). This paper strengthens their attacks on the GIGO principle. It shows, however, that we don't need the GIGO principle to motivate the crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument. Instead, it argues that the crucial premise is true for the following reasons: scientific knowledge is the result of successful inquiry; at some point we lacked scientific knowledge; and, we cannot successfully inquire without some prior knowledge.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46874,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"METAPHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":\"55 4-5\",\"pages\":\"535-546\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/meta.12703\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"METAPHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12703\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"METAPHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12703","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Rik Peels's (2017) Fundamental Argument is an important argument against epistemic scientism. The crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument is that if nonscientific sources of belief did not provide us with knowledge, neither could the sciences. But, the sciences do provide us with knowledge. Thus, epistemic scientism is false. This paper defends Peels's argument against recent criticisms. In particular, Hietanen and colleagues criticize Peels's argument for resting on what they call the “garbage in, garbage out” principle (GIGO). This paper strengthens their attacks on the GIGO principle. It shows, however, that we don't need the GIGO principle to motivate the crucial premise of the Fundamental Argument. Instead, it argues that the crucial premise is true for the following reasons: scientific knowledge is the result of successful inquiry; at some point we lacked scientific knowledge; and, we cannot successfully inquire without some prior knowledge.
期刊介绍:
Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.