考虑到数据泄露的风险,研究数字平台背景下的医疗保健数据共享。

IF 3 3区 医学 Q2 PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH Frontiers in Public Health Pub Date : 2024-11-06 eCollection Date: 2024-01-01 DOI:10.3389/fpubh.2024.1438579
Shizhen Bai, Jinjin Zheng, Wenya Wu, Dongrui Gao, Xiujin Gu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

背景:在中国的医疗保健领域,医疗数据共享已成为推动保险行业进步和提高患者参与医疗服务的关键力量。然而,由于担心数据安全和隐私保护,医疗机构往往不愿意共享数据。为了解决这一难题,我们的研究引入了一个以进化博弈论为基础的模型,并对其进行了实证验证,为促进医疗数据共享提供了一个强大的理论框架和可行的策略,同时协调了数据效用和隐私保护的双重需要:本文构建了一个进化博弈模型,涉及数字平台背景下的医疗机构、大数据创新平台和保险公司。该模型综合了数据泄露的外因、数据泄露的内因、赔偿金、政府惩罚、补贴、不合理收费、理赔效率和保险欺诈等因素:演化博弈的稳定性分析确定了医疗机构、平台和保险公司之间的八个均衡点。数值模拟表明,博弈趋向于策略 E 7 = (0, 0, 1),这表明医疗机构倾向于采用完全匿名的信息共享策略,平台倾向于实施严格监管,而保险公司则倾向于选择审计方法。敏感性分析表明,本研究选择的参数对博弈者的行为选择和博弈均衡点有显著影响:当违规事件发生时,医疗机构倾向于寻求平台和保险公司的共同分担。这促进了平台加强监管,并激励保险公司进行审计。如果违规责任归咎于平台或保险公司,责任分担制度将促使医疗机构选择完全匿名的信息共享策略。否则,医疗机构会选择部分匿名信息共享以获取更多利益。如果出现大面积的数据泄露,赔偿金额将增加,赔偿的作用将取代政府监管的作用。然后,政府对其进行惩罚,从而降低每个主体的积极性。
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Research on healthcare data sharing in the context of digital platforms considering the risks of data breaches.

Background: Within China's healthcare landscape, the sharing of medical data has emerged as a pivotal force propelling advancements in the insurance sector and enhancing patient engagement with healthcare services. However, medical institutions often exhibit reluctance toward data sharing due to apprehensions regarding data security and privacy safeguards. To navigate this conundrum, our research introduces and empirically validates a model grounded in evolutionary game theory, offering a robust theoretical framework and actionable strategies for facilitating healthcare data sharing while harmonizing the dual imperatives of data utility and privacy preservation.

Methods: In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model involving medical institutions, big data innovation platforms, and insurance companies within the context of digital platforms. The model integrates exogenous causes of data breaches, endogenous causes of data breaches, compensation payments, government penalties, subsidies, unreasonable fees, claims efficiency, and insurance fraud.

Results: The stability analysis of the evolutionary game identifies eight equilibrium points among medical institutions, platforms, and insurance companies. Numerical simulations demonstrate convergence toward strategy E 7 = (0, 0, 1), suggesting a trend for medical institutions to adopt a fully anonymous information-sharing strategy, platforms to implement strict regulation, and insurance companies to opt for an auditing approach. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the parameters selected in this study significantly influence the players' behavioral choices and the game's equilibria.

Conclusions: When breaches occur, medical institutions tend to seek co-sharing between platforms and insurance companies. This promotes enhanced regulation by platforms and incentivizes insurance companies to perform audits. If the responsibility for the breach is attributed to the platform or the insurance company, the liability sharing system will push healthcare organizations to choose a fully anonymous information sharing strategy. Otherwise, medical institutions will choose partially anonymous information sharing for more benefits. In case of widespread data leakage, the amount of compensation shall augment, and the role of compensation shall replace the role of government supervision. Then, the government shall penalize them, which shall reduce the motivation of each subject.

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来源期刊
Frontiers in Public Health
Frontiers in Public Health Medicine-Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
7.70%
发文量
4469
审稿时长
14 weeks
期刊介绍: Frontiers in Public Health is a multidisciplinary open-access journal which publishes rigorously peer-reviewed research and is at the forefront of disseminating and communicating scientific knowledge and impactful discoveries to researchers, academics, clinicians, policy makers and the public worldwide. The journal aims at overcoming current fragmentation in research and publication, promoting consistency in pursuing relevant scientific themes, and supporting finding dissemination and translation into practice. Frontiers in Public Health is organized into Specialty Sections that cover different areas of research in the field. Please refer to the author guidelines for details on article types and the submission process.
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