Framing affects postdecision preferences through self-preference inferences (and probably not dissonance).

Psychologists have long been intrigued by decision-induced changes in preferences where making a decision strengthens one's relative preference between more and less preferred options. This phenomenon has been explained through two prominent theories: a dissonance account, which suggests that it results from the decision maker's attempt to minimize an unpleasant emotional-motivational state of "dissonance," and an inference account, which posits that it reflects a process of inferring and updating one's "true" preferences. In the current research, we investigate whether, how, and why framing a decision as a choice or a rejection influences decision-induced preference modulation. Across 13 preregistered experiments, including seven (N = 6,248 participants from North America and Asia) reported in the main text, we find that reject-framed decisions between attractive options induce greater postdecision preference modulation (i.e., a larger preference gap between options) than choose-framed decisions, all else equal. Supporting the inference account, the effect is moderated by attribute similarity and choice set valence while being mediated consistently by perceived action diagnosticity. In contrast, purported moderators and process measures of the dissonance account received no support when tested. Additionally, we systematically address potential confounds associated with varying levels of "noise" in preference expression through decisions, an issue that had encumbered previous paradigms on preference modulation. Our findings suggest that changes in preference induced by ordinary day-to-day decisions primarily stem from an ongoing process of information inference and updating rather than dissonance reduction. This research also provides insights into the previously unforeseen consequences of framing interventions in policy and business. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).