{"title":"赌一把自费承诺合同能否遏制健身拖延症?","authors":"Devon Spika , Linnea Wickström Östervall , Ulf Gerdtham , Erik Wengström","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102943","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the use of a highly scalable intervention to help individuals achieve their physical activity goals: self-funded commitment contracts. Using a randomised experiment, we compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) and hard (incentivised) contracts among 1629 members of a gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one’s contract goal. Relative to the control group, being offered a hard contract significantly increases gym visits by 21%, while being offered a soft contract leads to an 8% increase.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 102943"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Put a bet on it: Can self-funded commitment contracts curb fitness procrastination?\",\"authors\":\"Devon Spika , Linnea Wickström Östervall , Ulf Gerdtham , Erik Wengström\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102943\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We investigate the use of a highly scalable intervention to help individuals achieve their physical activity goals: self-funded commitment contracts. Using a randomised experiment, we compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) and hard (incentivised) contracts among 1629 members of a gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one’s contract goal. Relative to the control group, being offered a hard contract significantly increases gym visits by 21%, while being offered a soft contract leads to an 8% increase.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50186,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Health Economics\",\"volume\":\"98 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102943\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Health Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000882\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Health Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000882","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Put a bet on it: Can self-funded commitment contracts curb fitness procrastination?
We investigate the use of a highly scalable intervention to help individuals achieve their physical activity goals: self-funded commitment contracts. Using a randomised experiment, we compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) and hard (incentivised) contracts among 1629 members of a gym in Stockholm, Sweden. We find a significant positive impact of being offered a hard contract on monthly visits to the gym and the probability of meeting one’s contract goal. Relative to the control group, being offered a hard contract significantly increases gym visits by 21%, while being offered a soft contract leads to an 8% increase.
期刊介绍:
This journal seeks articles related to the economics of health and medical care. Its scope will include the following topics:
Production and supply of health services;
Demand and utilization of health services;
Financing of health services;
Determinants of health, including investments in health and risky health behaviors;
Economic consequences of ill-health;
Behavioral models of demanders, suppliers and other health care agencies;
Evaluation of policy interventions that yield economic insights;
Efficiency and distributional aspects of health policy;
and such other topics as the Editors may deem appropriate.