了解动态互动

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-11-19 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.010
Konrad Grabiszewski , Alex Horenstein
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引用次数: 0

摘要

处理问题包括理解和解决问题。虽然有大量文献分析了问题的解决,但本文的重点在于理解。研究对象处理的问题是具有完整和完美信息的有限动态博弈。理解包括理解选择及其后果之间的关系。同样的后向归纳问题有两种不同的表现形式:树型和非树型。它们之间的关键区别在于,树型表示法直接提供了选择与后果之间的相关联系,而非树型表示法则必须确定选择与后果之间的相关联系。我们的研究包括 27 对不同深度的树/非树互动。我们通过观察理解的成功率及其所付出的努力来衡量和分析理解。我们的研究对象在理解方面非常吃力,甚至比解决问题还要吃力。深度越大,理解的认知努力就越大,同时,理解的成功率就越低。
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Understanding dynamic interactions
Dealing with a problem consists of understanding and solving. While there is vast literature analyzing problem solving, this article focuses on understanding. The problems subjects deal with are finite dynamic games with complete and perfect information. Understanding involves comprehending the relationships between choices and their consequences. The same backward-induction problem is presented using two distinct representations: tree and non-tree. The crucial difference between them is that the relevant connections between choices and consequences are directly provided in a tree but must be identified in a non-tree. Our study comprises 27 pairs of tree/non-tree interactions with a varying depth. We measure and analyze understanding by looking at success in understanding and the effort it involves. Our subjects struggle with understanding, even more so than solving. Greater depth increases the cognitive effort of understanding and, simultaneously, lowers the success rate in understanding.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
期刊最新文献
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