Sepideh Yeganegi , André O. Laplume , Bradley Bernard
{"title":"并非所有离职者都是平等的:职级和去向如何影响限制性条款的执行","authors":"Sepideh Yeganegi , André O. Laplume , Bradley Bernard","doi":"10.1016/j.jbvi.2024.e00505","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Restrictive covenants like non-competes, non-solicitations, and non-disclosures may pose barriers to spinout ventures and mobility to competitors. However, we know little about the enforceability of these agreements despite their widespread use and associated chilling effects. Examining 332 Canadian court decisions, we find a higher rate of enforcement in cases involving high rank leavers (i.e., managers and owners) versus low rank leavers (regular employees and contractors) especially those who form spinout ventures. Our key insight is that enforcement rates differ significantly across different types of leavers. Low rank leavers and their previous employers may overestimate the potential for enforcement, creating chilling effects (i.e., where employees think they are more restricted by their employment agreements than they really are) that can deter employee mobility and entrepreneurship.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":38078,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Business Venturing Insights","volume":"23 ","pages":"Article e00505"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Not all leavers are equal: How rank and destination influence enforcement of restrictive covenants\",\"authors\":\"Sepideh Yeganegi , André O. Laplume , Bradley Bernard\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jbvi.2024.e00505\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Restrictive covenants like non-competes, non-solicitations, and non-disclosures may pose barriers to spinout ventures and mobility to competitors. However, we know little about the enforceability of these agreements despite their widespread use and associated chilling effects. Examining 332 Canadian court decisions, we find a higher rate of enforcement in cases involving high rank leavers (i.e., managers and owners) versus low rank leavers (regular employees and contractors) especially those who form spinout ventures. Our key insight is that enforcement rates differ significantly across different types of leavers. Low rank leavers and their previous employers may overestimate the potential for enforcement, creating chilling effects (i.e., where employees think they are more restricted by their employment agreements than they really are) that can deter employee mobility and entrepreneurship.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":38078,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Business Venturing Insights\",\"volume\":\"23 \",\"pages\":\"Article e00505\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Business Venturing Insights\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235267342400057X\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Business, Management and Accounting\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Business Venturing Insights","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S235267342400057X","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Business, Management and Accounting","Score":null,"Total":0}
Not all leavers are equal: How rank and destination influence enforcement of restrictive covenants
Restrictive covenants like non-competes, non-solicitations, and non-disclosures may pose barriers to spinout ventures and mobility to competitors. However, we know little about the enforceability of these agreements despite their widespread use and associated chilling effects. Examining 332 Canadian court decisions, we find a higher rate of enforcement in cases involving high rank leavers (i.e., managers and owners) versus low rank leavers (regular employees and contractors) especially those who form spinout ventures. Our key insight is that enforcement rates differ significantly across different types of leavers. Low rank leavers and their previous employers may overestimate the potential for enforcement, creating chilling effects (i.e., where employees think they are more restricted by their employment agreements than they really are) that can deter employee mobility and entrepreneurship.