强调共同出资对多边环境基金有利吗?

IF 5.4 1区 经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES World Development Pub Date : 2024-11-26 DOI:10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106831
Matthew J. Kotchen , Andrew Vogt
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引用次数: 0

摘要

国际环境与发展机构在选择资助项目时越来越重视外部共同出资。本文探讨了对联合融资的重视是有助于促进机构目标的实现,还是会产生反常和低效的激励机制。我们提出了一个适用于任何资助机构的项目选择模型,但重点关注多边环境基金和气候变化。我们的研究表明,对于一个寻求最大化直接环境影响的基金来说,引入联合融资目标充其量是多余的,更有可能适得其反。我们使用两个主要多边环境基金--全球环境基金(GEF)和绿色气候基金(GCF)--的项目级数据来检验我们模型的意义。虽然减排和共同出资之间存在权衡,但我们发现,它们并没有强大到足以暗示当前的共同出资偏好正在削弱基金所能主张的环境效益。然而,我们也发现,在项目选择中强调共同出资很可能在全球范围内是低效的,因为共同出资比例越高的项目,每花费一美元的减排量往往越小。鉴于可用于实现全球气候目标的资金总体稀缺,这一发现应引起警惕。
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Is the emphasis on cofinancing good for environmental multilateral funds?
International environmental and development agencies increasingly emphasize external cofinancing when selecting projects to fund. This paper considers whether the emphasis on cofinancing helps promote institutional objectives, or creates perverse and inefficient incentives. We present a model of project selection that can apply to any funding agency, but focus on environmental multilateral funds and climate change. We show that introducing cofinancing objectives to a fund that seeks to maximize its immediate environmental impact is redundant as best, and more likely counterproductive. We test implications of our model using project-level data from two of the leading environmental multilateral funds, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). While tradeoffs exist between emission reductions and cofinancing, we find that they are not strong enough to imply that current cofinancing preferences are diminishing the environmental benefits that funds can claim. However, we also find that the emphasis on cofinancing in project selection is likely to be globally inefficient, as projects with greater cofinancing ratios tend to yield smaller emission reductions per gross dollar spent. This finding should sound a note of caution given the overall scarcity of financial resources available to achieve global climate goals.
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来源期刊
World Development
World Development Multiple-
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
5.80%
发文量
320
期刊介绍: World Development is a multi-disciplinary monthly journal of development studies. It seeks to explore ways of improving standards of living, and the human condition generally, by examining potential solutions to problems such as: poverty, unemployment, malnutrition, disease, lack of shelter, environmental degradation, inadequate scientific and technological resources, trade and payments imbalances, international debt, gender and ethnic discrimination, militarism and civil conflict, and lack of popular participation in economic and political life. Contributions offer constructive ideas and analysis, and highlight the lessons to be learned from the experiences of different nations, societies, and economies.
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