{"title":"隐蔽车辆误导及其检测:连续时间动力学的假设检验对策","authors":"Takashi Tanaka;Kenji Sawada;Yohei Watanabe;Mitsugu Iwamoto","doi":"10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3511398","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We formulate a stochastic zero-sum game over continuous-time dynamics to analyze the competition between the attacker, who tries to covertly misguide the vehicle to an unsafe region, versus the detector, who tries to detect the attack signal based on the observed trajectory of the vehicle. Based on Girsanov’s theorem and the generalized Neyman-Pearson lemma, we show that a constant bias injection attack as the attacker’s strategy and a likelihood ratio test as the detector’s strategy constitute the unique saddle point of the game. We also derive the first-order and the second-order exponents of the type II error as a function of the data length.","PeriodicalId":37235,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Control Systems Letters","volume":"8 ","pages":"2889-2894"},"PeriodicalIF":2.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Covert Vehicle Misguidance and Its Detection: A Hypothesis Testing Game Over Continuous-Time Dynamics\",\"authors\":\"Takashi Tanaka;Kenji Sawada;Yohei Watanabe;Mitsugu Iwamoto\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3511398\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We formulate a stochastic zero-sum game over continuous-time dynamics to analyze the competition between the attacker, who tries to covertly misguide the vehicle to an unsafe region, versus the detector, who tries to detect the attack signal based on the observed trajectory of the vehicle. Based on Girsanov’s theorem and the generalized Neyman-Pearson lemma, we show that a constant bias injection attack as the attacker’s strategy and a likelihood ratio test as the detector’s strategy constitute the unique saddle point of the game. We also derive the first-order and the second-order exponents of the type II error as a function of the data length.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37235,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Control Systems Letters\",\"volume\":\"8 \",\"pages\":\"2889-2894\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-12-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Control Systems Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10777028/\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Control Systems Letters","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10777028/","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Covert Vehicle Misguidance and Its Detection: A Hypothesis Testing Game Over Continuous-Time Dynamics
We formulate a stochastic zero-sum game over continuous-time dynamics to analyze the competition between the attacker, who tries to covertly misguide the vehicle to an unsafe region, versus the detector, who tries to detect the attack signal based on the observed trajectory of the vehicle. Based on Girsanov’s theorem and the generalized Neyman-Pearson lemma, we show that a constant bias injection attack as the attacker’s strategy and a likelihood ratio test as the detector’s strategy constitute the unique saddle point of the game. We also derive the first-order and the second-order exponents of the type II error as a function of the data length.