隐蔽车辆误导及其检测:连续时间动力学的假设检验对策

IF 2.4 Q2 AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS IEEE Control Systems Letters Pub Date : 2024-12-04 DOI:10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3511398
Takashi Tanaka;Kenji Sawada;Yohei Watanabe;Mitsugu Iwamoto
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们制定了一个连续时间动态的随机零和博弈来分析攻击者之间的竞争,攻击者试图隐蔽地将车辆引导到不安全区域,而探测器则试图根据观察到的车辆轨迹检测攻击信号。基于Girsanov定理和广义Neyman-Pearson引定理,我们证明了恒定偏差注入攻击作为攻击者的策略,似然比检验作为检测器的策略构成了博弈的唯一鞍点。我们还导出了II型误差的一阶和二阶指数作为数据长度的函数。
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Covert Vehicle Misguidance and Its Detection: A Hypothesis Testing Game Over Continuous-Time Dynamics
We formulate a stochastic zero-sum game over continuous-time dynamics to analyze the competition between the attacker, who tries to covertly misguide the vehicle to an unsafe region, versus the detector, who tries to detect the attack signal based on the observed trajectory of the vehicle. Based on Girsanov’s theorem and the generalized Neyman-Pearson lemma, we show that a constant bias injection attack as the attacker’s strategy and a likelihood ratio test as the detector’s strategy constitute the unique saddle point of the game. We also derive the first-order and the second-order exponents of the type II error as a function of the data length.
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来源期刊
IEEE Control Systems Letters
IEEE Control Systems Letters Mathematics-Control and Optimization
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
13.30%
发文量
471
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