企业的环境违法行为会影响贸易信用吗?来自中国的证据

IF 4.6 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Emerging Markets Review Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-27 DOI:10.1016/j.ememar.2024.101236
Guangming Gong, Ni Yang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过对2007年至2018年中国上市公司的大样本分析,我们发现,环境违规企业从供应商那里获得的贸易信贷少于同行。相互信任和偿还能力是企业环境违法行为影响贸易信用的两种合理机制。异质性检验表明,在市场竞争激烈的地区、银行竞争程度较低的地区和市场化程度较低的地区,这种降低幅度更大。最后,我们发现企业环境违法行为的影响会受到处罚机构水平的影响,并会进一步延伸到供应链下游。
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Do corporate environmental violations affect trade credit? Evidence from China
Using a large sample of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018, we show that firms with environmental violations receive less trade credit from suppliers than their counterparts. Mutual trust and repayment ability are two plausible mechanisms through which corporate environmental violations affect trade credit. Heterogeneity tests show that this reduction is greater for firms facing fierce market competition, firms in regions with lower bank competition, and firms in regions with lower marketization. Finally, we find that the impact of corporate environmental violations can be influenced by the penalty agency level and can extend further down the supply chain.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.10
自引率
4.20%
发文量
85
审稿时长
100 days
期刊介绍: The intent of the editors is to consolidate Emerging Markets Review as the premier vehicle for publishing high impact empirical and theoretical studies in emerging markets finance. Preference will be given to comparative studies that take global and regional perspectives, detailed single country studies that address critical policy issues and have significant global and regional implications, and papers that address the interactions of national and international financial architecture. We especially welcome papers that take institutional as well as financial perspectives.
期刊最新文献
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