反复严格优势的病理重新审视

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-01 Epub Date: 2025-01-14 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112178

Xuewen Qian, Chen Qu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们重新审视了无限博弈中严格劣势策略迭代消除的两种病态：虚假纳什均衡和顺序依赖。通过引入有界优势关系（Hsieh et al., 2023），我们证明了IESDS的有界版本缓解了前者的问题，并对后者保持中立。第二点是通过一系列使用序数的例子来说明的。给出了伪纳什均衡不存在的充分必要条件。

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Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited

We revisit two pathologies of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) in infinite games: spurious Nash equilibria and order dependence. By introducing bounded dominance relations (Hsieh et al., 2023), we demonstrate that a bounded version of IESDS mitigates the former issue and is neutral to the latter. The second point is illustrated through a series of examples using ordinals. We also provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the non-existence of spurious Nash equilibria.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.