{"title":"下属高管信心与劳动投入效率","authors":"Joye Khoo , Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung","doi":"10.1016/j.iref.2025.103896","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine confidence, an important type of cognitive bias, at the subordinate executive level and provide new insights to the literature on labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of US firms from 1999 to 2020, we find that firms having highly confident subordinate executives exacerbates inefficient labor investment, which is consistent with the view that highly confident subordinate executives influencing risk-taking decisions to their advantage(s), which distorts labor investment efficiency. This detrimental impact on labor investment efficiency mainly manifests in firms with weaker external governance. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, alternative proxies for both subordinate executives’ traits and labor investment efficiency, additional control variables (including CEO traits and bias), and various approaches to addressing endogeneity issues. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how personal traits in the top management team matter in labor investment decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":14444,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Economics & Finance","volume":"98 ","pages":"Article 103896"},"PeriodicalIF":5.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Subordinate executives’ confidence and labor investment efficiency\",\"authors\":\"Joye Khoo , Adrian (Wai Kong) Cheung\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.iref.2025.103896\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We examine confidence, an important type of cognitive bias, at the subordinate executive level and provide new insights to the literature on labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of US firms from 1999 to 2020, we find that firms having highly confident subordinate executives exacerbates inefficient labor investment, which is consistent with the view that highly confident subordinate executives influencing risk-taking decisions to their advantage(s), which distorts labor investment efficiency. This detrimental impact on labor investment efficiency mainly manifests in firms with weaker external governance. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, alternative proxies for both subordinate executives’ traits and labor investment efficiency, additional control variables (including CEO traits and bias), and various approaches to addressing endogeneity issues. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how personal traits in the top management team matter in labor investment decisions.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14444,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Review of Economics & Finance\",\"volume\":\"98 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103896\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Review of Economics & Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056025000590\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2025/1/19 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Economics & Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056025000590","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2025/1/19 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Subordinate executives’ confidence and labor investment efficiency
We examine confidence, an important type of cognitive bias, at the subordinate executive level and provide new insights to the literature on labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of US firms from 1999 to 2020, we find that firms having highly confident subordinate executives exacerbates inefficient labor investment, which is consistent with the view that highly confident subordinate executives influencing risk-taking decisions to their advantage(s), which distorts labor investment efficiency. This detrimental impact on labor investment efficiency mainly manifests in firms with weaker external governance. Our findings are robust to alternative explanations, alternative proxies for both subordinate executives’ traits and labor investment efficiency, additional control variables (including CEO traits and bias), and various approaches to addressing endogeneity issues. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on how personal traits in the top management team matter in labor investment decisions.
期刊介绍：
The International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF) is a scholarly journal devoted to the publication of high quality theoretical and empirical articles in all areas of international economics, macroeconomics and financial economics. Contributions that facilitate the communications between the real and the financial sectors of the economy are of particular interest.
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