你不知道的,不会伤害到你:避免为环保事业捐款

IF 6.3 2区 经济学 Q1 ECOLOGY Ecological Economics Pub Date : 2025-07-01 Epub Date: 2025-03-06 DOI:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2025.108578
Valeria Fanghella , Lisette Ibanez , John Thøgersen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

最近的研究表明,人们愿意花钱来避免亲社会行为的要求。然而,不知道这是否适用于私人环保请求。为了研究这一点,我们进行了一个预先注册的、激励的在线实验,参与者连续玩了两个独裁者游戏,并选择了一个环境慈善机构。在第一阶段,我们改变了独裁者游戏的类型和2 × 2阶乘受试者间设计提供的信息:(i)标准独裁者游戏与具有昂贵选择退出选项的独裁者游戏;(ii)有或没有关于上一届会议参与者平均捐款的社会信息。在第二阶段,所有参与者都玩了一个标准的独裁者游戏,其主要目的是捕捉第一阶段的时间溢出效应。总的来说,9%的参与者选择了退出,这导致在有昂贵退出选项的独裁者游戏中的捐款减少。在标准的独裁者游戏中,提供社会信息会减少捐赠,而当昂贵的选择退出选项可用时,似乎会增加选择退出,但在统计上并不显著。根据第一阶段的选择和决策,不同的溢出效应出现了,这表明初始行为的背景和动机影响了时间溢出的方向。
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What you don't know, can't hurt you: Avoiding donation requests for environmental causes
Recent research suggests that people are willing to pay to avoid requests for prosocial behavior. However, it is unknown whether this applies to private pro-environmental requests. To study this, we conducted a pre-registered, incentivized online experiment where participants played two consecutive dictator games with an environmental charity of their choice. In stage 1, we varied the type of dictator game and the information provided in a 2 × 2 factorial between-subject design: (i) a standard dictator game versus one with a costly opt-out option; (ii) with or without social information about the average donation made by participants in a previous session. All participants played a standard dictator game in stage 2, the primary aim of which was to capture temporal spillovers from stage 1. Overall, 9 % of participants opted out, leading to lower donations in the dictator game with the costly opt-out option. Providing social information decreases donations in the standard dictator game and appears to increase opt-outs when the costly opt-out option is available, but not statistically significant. Distinct spillover effects emerged depending on the options available and decisions made in stage 1, indicating that the context and motivation of the initial behavior affect the direction of the temporal spillover.
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来源期刊
Ecological Economics
Ecological Economics 环境科学-环境科学
CiteScore
12.00
自引率
5.70%
发文量
313
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: Ecological Economics is concerned with extending and integrating the understanding of the interfaces and interplay between "nature''s household" (ecosystems) and "humanity''s household" (the economy). Ecological economics is an interdisciplinary field defined by a set of concrete problems or challenges related to governing economic activity in a way that promotes human well-being, sustainability, and justice. The journal thus emphasizes critical work that draws on and integrates elements of ecological science, economics, and the analysis of values, behaviors, cultural practices, institutional structures, and societal dynamics. The journal is transdisciplinary in spirit and methodologically open, drawing on the insights offered by a variety of intellectual traditions, and appealing to a diverse readership. Specific research areas covered include: valuation of natural resources, sustainable agriculture and development, ecologically integrated technology, integrated ecologic-economic modelling at scales from local to regional to global, implications of thermodynamics for economics and ecology, renewable resource management and conservation, critical assessments of the basic assumptions underlying current economic and ecological paradigms and the implications of alternative assumptions, economic and ecological consequences of genetically engineered organisms, and gene pool inventory and management, alternative principles for valuing natural wealth, integrating natural resources and environmental services into national income and wealth accounts, methods of implementing efficient environmental policies, case studies of economic-ecologic conflict or harmony, etc. New issues in this area are rapidly emerging and will find a ready forum in Ecological Economics.
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