未消毒和不公平:COVID-19救助资金如何加剧美国医疗保健系统的不平等。

IF 3.3 3区 医学 Q1 HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI:10.1215/03616878-9155977
Colleen M Grogan, Yu-An Lin, Michael K Gusmano
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引用次数: 11

摘要

背景:2020年的《关怀法案》为医院和其他提供者分配了提供者救济资金。我们调查这些资金的分配方式是否公平地满足了与covid -19相关的医疗和财务需求。美国的医疗保健系统分为“富人”和“穷人”。财政已经薄弱的卫生保健安全网医院照顾了大部分COVID-19病例。相比之下,“有钱”的医院在经济上遭受了损失,因为他们最有利可图的手术是选择性的,在COVID-19爆发期间被推迟了。方法:为了获得美国各医院的救济基金数据,我们从HHS网站的数据开始。我们使用兰德医院数据工具来分析基金分配如何与医院特征相关联。结果:我们的分析显示,手头现金最多的“有”医院比手头现金少于50天的医院(“没有”)每张病床获得更多的资金。结论:尽管COVID-19在大流行早期暴露了极端的种族不平等,但联邦政府奖励那些为美国最特权人群服务的医院,而主要为低收入有色人种服务的医院却很少。
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Unsanitized and Unfair: How COVID-19 Bailout Funds Refuel Inequity in the US Health Care System.

Context: The CARES Act of 2020 allocated provider relief funds to hospitals and other providers. We investigate whether these funds were distributed in a way that responded fairly to COVID-19-related medical and financial need. The US health care system is bifurcated into the "haves" and "have nots." The health care safety net hospitals, which were already financially weak, cared for the bulk of COVID-19 cases. In contrast, the "have" hospitals suffered financially because their most profitable procedures are elective and were postponed during the COVID-19 outbreak.

Methods: To obtain relief fund data for each hospital in the United States, we started with data from the HHS website. We use the RAND Hospital Data tool to analyze how fund distributions are associated with hospital characteristics.

Findings: Our analysis reveals that the "have" hospitals with the most days of cash on hand received more funding per bed than hospitals with fewer than 50 days of cash on hand (the "have nots").

Conclusions: Despite extreme racial inequities, which COVID-19 exposed early in the pandemic, the federal government rewards those hospitals that cater to the most privileged in the United States, leaving hospitals that predominantly serve low-income people of color with less.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
46
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: A leading journal in its field, and the primary source of communication across the many disciplines it serves, the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law focuses on the initiation, formulation, and implementation of health policy and analyzes the relations between government and health—past, present, and future.
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