监管受益人和非正式机构决策。

IF 2.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Cornell Law Review Pub Date : 2007-03-01
Nina A Mendelson
{"title":"监管受益人和非正式机构决策。","authors":"Nina A Mendelson","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Administrative agencies frequently use guidance documents to set policy broadly and prospectively in areas ranging from Department of Education Title IX enforcement to Food and Drug Administration regulation of direct-to- consumer pharmaceutical advertising. In form, these guidances often closely resemble the policies agencies issue in ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, guidances are generally developed with little public participation and are often immune from judicial review. Nonetheless, guidances can prompt significant changes in behavior from those the agencies regulate. A number of commentators have guardedly defended the current state of affairs. Though guidances lack some important procedural safeguards, they can help agencies supervise low-level employees and supply valuable information to regulated entities regarding how an agency will implement a program. Thus far, however, the debate has largely ignored the distinct and substantial interests of regulatory beneficiaries--those who expect to benefit from government regulation of others. Regulatory beneficiaries include, among others, pharmaceutical consumers, environmental users, and workers seeking safe workplaces. When agencies make policy informally, regulatory beneficiaries suffer distinctive losses to their ability to participate in the agency's decision and to invoke judicial review. This Article argues that considering the interests of regulatory beneficiaries strengthens the case for procedural reform. The Article then assesses some possible solutions.</p>","PeriodicalId":51518,"journal":{"name":"Cornell Law Review","volume":"92 3","pages":"397-452"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Regulatory beneficiaries and informal agency policymaking.\",\"authors\":\"Nina A Mendelson\",\"doi\":\"\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Administrative agencies frequently use guidance documents to set policy broadly and prospectively in areas ranging from Department of Education Title IX enforcement to Food and Drug Administration regulation of direct-to- consumer pharmaceutical advertising. In form, these guidances often closely resemble the policies agencies issue in ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, guidances are generally developed with little public participation and are often immune from judicial review. Nonetheless, guidances can prompt significant changes in behavior from those the agencies regulate. A number of commentators have guardedly defended the current state of affairs. Though guidances lack some important procedural safeguards, they can help agencies supervise low-level employees and supply valuable information to regulated entities regarding how an agency will implement a program. Thus far, however, the debate has largely ignored the distinct and substantial interests of regulatory beneficiaries--those who expect to benefit from government regulation of others. Regulatory beneficiaries include, among others, pharmaceutical consumers, environmental users, and workers seeking safe workplaces. When agencies make policy informally, regulatory beneficiaries suffer distinctive losses to their ability to participate in the agency's decision and to invoke judicial review. This Article argues that considering the interests of regulatory beneficiaries strengthens the case for procedural reform. The Article then assesses some possible solutions.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51518,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cornell Law Review\",\"volume\":\"92 3\",\"pages\":\"397-452\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cornell Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cornell Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

行政机构经常使用指导性文件来制定广泛而有前瞻性的政策,范围从教育部第九章的执行到食品和药物管理局对直接面向消费者的药品广告的监管。在形式上,这些指导方针通常与机构在普通通知和评论规则制定中发布的政策非常相似。然而,指南的制定通常很少有公众参与,而且往往免于司法审查。尽管如此,指导方针可以促使那些机构监管的行为发生重大变化。许多评论家谨慎地为目前的事态辩护。尽管指南缺乏一些重要的程序保障,但它们可以帮助机构监督低级别雇员,并向受监管实体提供有关机构如何实施计划的宝贵信息。然而,到目前为止,这场辩论在很大程度上忽视了监管受益者的独特而实质性的利益——那些希望从政府对他人的监管中受益的人。监管的受益者包括药品消费者、环境使用者和寻求安全工作场所的工人。当机构非正式地制定政策时,监管受益人在参与机构决策和援引司法审查的能力方面遭受明显损失。本文认为,考虑监管受益人的利益加强了程序改革的理由。然后,本文评估了一些可能的解决方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Regulatory beneficiaries and informal agency policymaking.

Administrative agencies frequently use guidance documents to set policy broadly and prospectively in areas ranging from Department of Education Title IX enforcement to Food and Drug Administration regulation of direct-to- consumer pharmaceutical advertising. In form, these guidances often closely resemble the policies agencies issue in ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking. However, guidances are generally developed with little public participation and are often immune from judicial review. Nonetheless, guidances can prompt significant changes in behavior from those the agencies regulate. A number of commentators have guardedly defended the current state of affairs. Though guidances lack some important procedural safeguards, they can help agencies supervise low-level employees and supply valuable information to regulated entities regarding how an agency will implement a program. Thus far, however, the debate has largely ignored the distinct and substantial interests of regulatory beneficiaries--those who expect to benefit from government regulation of others. Regulatory beneficiaries include, among others, pharmaceutical consumers, environmental users, and workers seeking safe workplaces. When agencies make policy informally, regulatory beneficiaries suffer distinctive losses to their ability to participate in the agency's decision and to invoke judicial review. This Article argues that considering the interests of regulatory beneficiaries strengthens the case for procedural reform. The Article then assesses some possible solutions.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
4.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Founded in 1915, the Cornell Law Review is a student-run and student-edited journal that strives to publish novel scholarship that will have an immediate and lasting impact on the legal community. The Cornell Law Review publishes six issues annually consisting of articles, essays, book reviews, and student notes.
期刊最新文献
The Health Security Act: coercion and distrust for the market. Laws Intentionally Favoring Mainstream Religions: An Unhelpful Comparison to Race The Role of History in Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Study Making state civil procedure Stricken: the Need for Positive Statutory Law to Prevent Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes of Disabled Jurors.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1