{"title":"放弃与和解:解决政治和普通法对胎儿杀人法的反对意见。","authors":"Douglas S Curran","doi":"","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Fetal homicide laws criminalize killing a fetus largely to the same extent as killing any other human being. Historically, the common law did not generally recognize feticide as a crime, but this was because of the evidentiary \"born-alive\" rule, not because of the substantive understanding of the term \"human being.\" As medicine and science have advanced, states have become increasingly willing to abandon this evidentiary rule and to criminalize feticide as homicide. Although most states have recognized the crime of fetal homicide, fourteen have not. This is largely the result of two independent obstacles: (judicial) adherence to the born-alive rule and (legislative) concern that fetal homicide laws could erode constitutionally protected reproductive rights. This Note explores a variety of fetal homicide laws that states have adopted, demonstrating that popular opinion has shifted toward recognizing this crime. It then directly confronts the objections that have prevented other states from adopting such laws: it first reviews the literature suggesting that the born-alive rule should be abandoned, as it is an obsolete evidentiary standard; it then argues that constitutionally protected reproductive liberties can be reconciled with, and in fact augmented by, punishing the killing of a fetus as a homicide.</p>","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"58 6","pages":"1107-42"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Abandonment and reconciliation: addressing political and common law objections to fetal homicide laws.\",\"authors\":\"Douglas S Curran\",\"doi\":\"\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Fetal homicide laws criminalize killing a fetus largely to the same extent as killing any other human being. Historically, the common law did not generally recognize feticide as a crime, but this was because of the evidentiary \\\"born-alive\\\" rule, not because of the substantive understanding of the term \\\"human being.\\\" As medicine and science have advanced, states have become increasingly willing to abandon this evidentiary rule and to criminalize feticide as homicide. Although most states have recognized the crime of fetal homicide, fourteen have not. This is largely the result of two independent obstacles: (judicial) adherence to the born-alive rule and (legislative) concern that fetal homicide laws could erode constitutionally protected reproductive rights. This Note explores a variety of fetal homicide laws that states have adopted, demonstrating that popular opinion has shifted toward recognizing this crime. It then directly confronts the objections that have prevented other states from adopting such laws: it first reviews the literature suggesting that the born-alive rule should be abandoned, as it is an obsolete evidentiary standard; it then argues that constitutionally protected reproductive liberties can be reconciled with, and in fact augmented by, punishing the killing of a fetus as a homicide.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47625,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"58 6\",\"pages\":\"1107-42\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abandonment and reconciliation: addressing political and common law objections to fetal homicide laws.
Fetal homicide laws criminalize killing a fetus largely to the same extent as killing any other human being. Historically, the common law did not generally recognize feticide as a crime, but this was because of the evidentiary "born-alive" rule, not because of the substantive understanding of the term "human being." As medicine and science have advanced, states have become increasingly willing to abandon this evidentiary rule and to criminalize feticide as homicide. Although most states have recognized the crime of fetal homicide, fourteen have not. This is largely the result of two independent obstacles: (judicial) adherence to the born-alive rule and (legislative) concern that fetal homicide laws could erode constitutionally protected reproductive rights. This Note explores a variety of fetal homicide laws that states have adopted, demonstrating that popular opinion has shifted toward recognizing this crime. It then directly confronts the objections that have prevented other states from adopting such laws: it first reviews the literature suggesting that the born-alive rule should be abandoned, as it is an obsolete evidentiary standard; it then argues that constitutionally protected reproductive liberties can be reconciled with, and in fact augmented by, punishing the killing of a fetus as a homicide.
期刊介绍:
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.