The right to assistive technology.

In this paper, I argue that disabled people have a right to assistive technology (AT), but this right cannot be grounded simply in a broader right to health care or in a more comprehensive view like the capabilities approach to justice. Both of these options are plagued by issues that I refer to as the problem of constriction, where the theory does not justify enough of the AT that disabled people should have access to, and the problem of overextension, where the theory cannot adequately identify an upper limit on the AT that people have a right to. As an alternative to these justificatory frameworks, I argue that disabled people are owed access to AT at the expense of nondisabled people as a matter of compensatory justice. That is, I defend the position that disabled people are owed AT as part of due compensation for the harms they experience from being disadvantaged by society's dominant cooperative scheme and the violation of their right to equality of opportunity that such disadvantage entails. I also propose a method for identifying an upper limit to what this right to AT requires. In this way, I argue that compensatory justice avoids both the problem of constriction and the problem of overextension.