Pub Date : 2024-09-14DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09685-z
Pablo García-Barranquero, Joan Llorca Albareda
Susan B. Levin argues that the human confidence that an ageless body would be better is irrational. She offers a Kantian-inspired argument to show that human understanding cannot rationally access the experiences of a post-human and ageless existence. We challenge this rationale with a three-step argument: first, an ageless body does not have to be post-human. One should distinguish between the transhumanist projects of life extension and accounts focused on enhancing well-being and quality of life. An existence without aging does not require a radical change in one's temporal intuitions, which makes rational discussion possible. Second, we defend that biological aging does not entail any valuable goods. These goods refer to the chronological dimension of aging. Finally, we argue that biological aging is indeed negative and one may need biotechnological interventions in aging to achieve internal transcendence. Thus, we rationally argue that an ageless body would be better.
苏珊-莱文(Susan B. Levin)认为,人类认为不老的身体会更好的信心是非理性的。她提出了一个受康德启发的论点,说明人类的理解力无法理性地获取后人类和无老存在的经验。我们通过三步论证对这一理由提出质疑:首先,无龄身体不一定是后人类的。我们应该区分超人类主义的生命延续计划和以提高福祉和生活质量为重点的论述。没有衰老的存在并不需要彻底改变人的时间直觉,这使得理性讨论成为可能。其次,我们认为生物衰老不会带来任何有价值的物品。这些物品指的是衰老的时间维度。最后,我们认为生物衰老确实是负面的,人们可能需要对衰老进行生物技术干预,以实现内在超越。因此,我们理性地认为,不老的身体会更好。
{"title":"An ageless body does not imply transhumanism: A reply to Levin","authors":"Pablo García-Barranquero, Joan Llorca Albareda","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09685-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09685-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Susan B. Levin argues that the human confidence that an ageless body would be better is irrational. She offers a Kantian-inspired argument to show that human understanding cannot rationally access the experiences of a post-human and ageless existence. We challenge this rationale with a three-step argument: first, an ageless body does not have to be post-human. One should distinguish between the transhumanist projects of life extension and accounts focused on enhancing well-being and quality of life. An existence without aging does not require a radical change in one's temporal intuitions, which makes rational discussion possible. Second, we defend that biological aging does not entail any valuable goods. These goods refer to the chronological dimension of aging. Finally, we argue that biological aging is indeed negative and one may need biotechnological interventions in aging to achieve internal transcendence. Thus, we rationally argue that <i>an ageless body would be better</i>.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"214 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142259457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s11017-024-09682-2
Christopher Bobier
The purpose of a first-in-human (FIH) clinical trial is to gather information about how the drug or device affects and interacts with the human body: its safety, side effects, and (potential) dosage. As such, the primary goal of a FIH trial is not participant benefit but to gain knowledge of drug or device efficacy, i.e., baseline human safety knowledge. Some FIH clinical trials carry significant foreseeable risk to participants with little to no foreseeable participant benefit. Participation in such trials would be a bad deal for participants, and the research is considered justifiable because of the promise of significant potential social benefit. I argue that there is an ethical tension inherent in risky FIH research and that researchers should fairly compensate risky FIH trial participants. This does not make the risk–benefit outcome more favorable for participants; rather, it amounts to a collective reckoning with the ethical tension inherent in the research.
首次人体(FIH)临床试验的目的是收集有关药物或器械如何影响人体并与人体相互作用的信息:其安全性、副作用和(潜在)剂量。因此,FIH 试验的主要目的不是让参与者受益,而是了解药物或器械的疗效,即人体安全性基线知识。有些 FIH 临床试验会给参与者带来巨大的可预见风险,而几乎没有可预见的参与者获益。参与此类试验对参与者来说是一笔不划算的交易,而研究被认为是合理的,因为有望带来巨大的潜在社会效益。我认为,有风险的 FIH 研究本身就存在伦理矛盾,研究人员应该公平地补偿有风险的 FIH 试验参与者。这并不会使风险-收益结果对参与者更有利;相反,这相当于对研究中固有的伦理紧张关系进行集体清算。
{"title":"Risky first-in-human clinical trials on medically fragile persons: owning the moral cost","authors":"Christopher Bobier","doi":"10.1007/s11017-024-09682-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-024-09682-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The purpose of a first-in-human (FIH) clinical trial is to gather information about how the drug or device affects and interacts with the human body: its safety, side effects, and (potential) dosage. As such, the primary goal of a FIH trial is not participant benefit but to gain knowledge of drug or device efficacy, i.e., baseline human safety knowledge. Some FIH clinical trials carry <i>significant</i> foreseeable risk to participants with little to no foreseeable participant benefit. Participation in such trials would be a bad deal for participants, and the research is considered justifiable because of the promise of significant potential social benefit. I argue that there is an ethical tension inherent in risky FIH research and that researchers should fairly compensate risky FIH trial participants. This does not make the risk–benefit outcome more favorable for participants; rather, it amounts to a collective reckoning with the ethical tension inherent in the research.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"202 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142193984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01Epub Date: 2023-08-17DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09640-4
Marcel Mertz, Ilvie Prince, Ines Pietschmann
It can be assumed that value judgements, which are needed to judge what is 'good' or 'better' and what is 'bad' or 'worse', are involved in every decision-making process. The theoretical understanding and analysis of value judgements is, therefore, important in the context of bioethics, for example, to be able to ethically assess real decision-making processes in biomedical practice and make recommendations for improvements. However, real decision-making processes and the value judgements inherent in them must first be investigated empirically ('empirical bioethics'). For this to succeed, what exactly a 'value judgement' is and of what components it might consist must initially be theoretically clarified. A corresponding conceptual model can then support or even enable empirical data collection and analysis and, above all, subsequent ethical analysis and evaluation. This paper, therefore, presents a value judgement model with its theoretical derivation. It also illustrates its application in an interview study of decision-making between animal experimentation and alternative methods in the context of biomedical research. Though the model itself can be theoretically deepened and extended, the application of the model works in general and helps to uncover what value judgements can enter into decision-making. However, the empirical methods, for example, qualitative interviews, can also be better oriented towards eliciting value judgements (as understood according to the model). Further applications of the model to other topics or by means of other empirical methods are conceivable.
{"title":"Values, decision-making and empirical bioethics: a conceptual model for empirically identifying and analyzing value judgements.","authors":"Marcel Mertz, Ilvie Prince, Ines Pietschmann","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09640-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09640-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>It can be assumed that value judgements, which are needed to judge what is 'good' or 'better' and what is 'bad' or 'worse', are involved in every decision-making process. The theoretical understanding and analysis of value judgements is, therefore, important in the context of bioethics, for example, to be able to ethically assess real decision-making processes in biomedical practice and make recommendations for improvements. However, real decision-making processes and the value judgements inherent in them must first be investigated empirically ('empirical bioethics'). For this to succeed, what exactly a 'value judgement' is and of what components it might consist must initially be theoretically clarified. A corresponding conceptual model can then support or even enable empirical data collection and analysis and, above all, subsequent ethical analysis and evaluation. This paper, therefore, presents a value judgement model with its theoretical derivation. It also illustrates its application in an interview study of decision-making between animal experimentation and alternative methods in the context of biomedical research. Though the model itself can be theoretically deepened and extended, the application of the model works in general and helps to uncover what value judgements can enter into decision-making. However, the empirical methods, for example, qualitative interviews, can also be better oriented towards eliciting value judgements (as understood according to the model). Further applications of the model to other topics or by means of other empirical methods are conceivable.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"567-587"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10643456/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10012283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01Epub Date: 2023-08-08DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09636-0
Nir Ben-Moshe, Benjamin A Levinstein, Jonathan Livengood
In this paper, we illustrate some serious difficulties involved in conveying information about uncertain risks and securing informed consent for risky interventions in a clinical setting. We argue that in order to secure informed consent for a medical intervention, physicians often need to do more than report a bare, numerical probability value. When probabilities are given, securing informed consent generally requires communicating how probability expressions are to be interpreted and communicating something about the quality and quantity of the evidence for the probabilities reported. Patients may also require guidance on how probability claims may or may not be relevant to their decisions, and physicians should be ready to help patients understand these issues.
{"title":"Probability and informed consent.","authors":"Nir Ben-Moshe, Benjamin A Levinstein, Jonathan Livengood","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09636-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09636-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, we illustrate some serious difficulties involved in conveying information about uncertain risks and securing informed consent for risky interventions in a clinical setting. We argue that in order to secure informed consent for a medical intervention, physicians often need to do more than report a bare, numerical probability value. When probabilities are given, securing informed consent generally requires communicating how probability expressions are to be interpreted and communicating something about the quality and quantity of the evidence for the probabilities reported. Patients may also require guidance on how probability claims may or may not be relevant to their decisions, and physicians should be ready to help patients understand these issues.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"545-566"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9954671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01Epub Date: 2023-08-24DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09641-3
Steven Tresker
In this article, I present a philosophical account of medical treatment. In support of this account, I offer a suggestive account of medical conditions. The account of medical treatment uses three desiderata to demarcate treatment from non-treatment. Namely, a treatment should: (1) be describable by features that enable it to be standardized and characterized as a discrete intervention, (2) target a specific medical condition, and (3) have the possibility of being effective. The account of medical conditions underlies the second desideratum and attempts to tie medical conditions closely to biological dysfunction, while also including some conditions for which biological dysfunction is absent or its presence uncertain. I offer a simple typology of treatments and show how the accounts are relevant to treatment effectiveness, disease, placebos, contested treatments, and treatment standardization.
{"title":"An account of medical treatment, with a preliminary account of medical conditions.","authors":"Steven Tresker","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09641-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09641-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this article, I present a philosophical account of medical treatment. In support of this account, I offer a suggestive account of medical conditions. The account of medical treatment uses three desiderata to demarcate treatment from non-treatment. Namely, a treatment should: (1) be describable by features that enable it to be standardized and characterized as a discrete intervention, (2) target a specific medical condition, and (3) have the possibility of being effective. The account of medical conditions underlies the second desideratum and attempts to tie medical conditions closely to biological dysfunction, while also including some conditions for which biological dysfunction is absent or its presence uncertain. I offer a simple typology of treatments and show how the accounts are relevant to treatment effectiveness, disease, placebos, contested treatments, and treatment standardization.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"607-633"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10064946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09644-0
Austin McCoy
{"title":"Johnson, L. Syd M. The ethics of uncertainty: entangled ethical and epistemic risks in disorders of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. 304 pp. $55 (hardcover). ISBN: 9780190943646","authors":"Austin McCoy","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09644-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09644-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136211156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01Epub Date: 2023-05-12DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09623-5
Anna Hirsch
Patients are usually granted autonomy rights, including the right to consent to or refuse treatment. These rights are commonly attributed to patients if they fulfil certain conditions. For example, a patient must sufficiently understand the information given to them before making a treatment decision. On the one hand, there is a large group of patients who meet these conditions. On the other hand, there is a group that clearly does not meet these conditions, including comatose patients or patients in the late stages of Alzheimer's disease. Then there is a group of patients who fall into the range in between. At the lower end of this range are so-called 'marginal agents,' which include young children and patients in the middle stages of Alzheimer's disease. They also do not meet the typical requirements for autonomy, which is why they are usually granted fewer autonomy rights. However, some of them are capable of 'pre-forms' of autonomy that express what is important to them. These pre-forms differ from mere desires and reflect the identification/authenticity condition of autonomy. They have something in common with autonomous attitudes, choices, and actions - namely, they express the value of autonomy. As I will argue, autonomy is a value worthy of protection and promotion - even in its non-reflexive forms. Against this background, it becomes clear why we have autonomy duties, more precisely positive, autonomy-enabling duties, towards marginal agents and why we should give them as much attention as autonomy duties towards competent patients.
{"title":"Why we have duties of autonomy towards marginal agents.","authors":"Anna Hirsch","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09623-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09623-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Patients are usually granted autonomy rights, including the right to consent to or refuse treatment. These rights are commonly attributed to patients if they fulfil certain conditions. For example, a patient must sufficiently understand the information given to them before making a treatment decision. On the one hand, there is a large group of patients who meet these conditions. On the other hand, there is a group that clearly does not meet these conditions, including comatose patients or patients in the late stages of Alzheimer's disease. Then there is a group of patients who fall into the range in between. At the lower end of this range are so-called 'marginal agents,' which include young children and patients in the middle stages of Alzheimer's disease. They also do not meet the typical requirements for autonomy, which is why they are usually granted fewer autonomy rights. However, some of them are capable of 'pre-forms' of autonomy that express what is important to them. These pre-forms differ from mere desires and reflect the identification/authenticity condition of autonomy. They have something in common with autonomous attitudes, choices, and actions - namely, they express the value of autonomy. As I will argue, autonomy is a value worthy of protection and promotion - even in its non-reflexive forms. Against this background, it becomes clear why we have autonomy duties, more precisely positive, autonomy-enabling duties, towards marginal agents and why we should give them as much attention as autonomy duties towards competent patients.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"453-475"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10564671/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9501901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01Epub Date: 2023-05-24DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09627-1
Eisuke Sakakibara
The notion of epistemic injustice was first applied to cases of discrimination against women and people of color but has since come to refer to wider issues related to social justice. This paper applies the concept of epistemic injustice to problems in the therapeutic relationship between psychiatrists and psychiatric patients. To this end, it is necessary to acknowledge psychiatrists as professionals with expertise in treating mental disorders, which impair the patient's rationality, sometimes leading to false beliefs, such as delusions. This paper classifies the characteristic features of the therapeutic relationship in psychiatry into three stages: those of a professional-client relationship, those of a doctor-patient relationship, and those of a psychiatrist-psychiatric patient relationship. Epistemic injustice is prevalent in psychiatric care owing to prejudice against patients with mental disorders. However, it is also predisposed by the roles that psychiatrists play in relation to psychiatric patients. This paper suggests some ameliorative measures based on the analysis.
{"title":"Epistemic injustice in the therapeutic relationship in psychiatry.","authors":"Eisuke Sakakibara","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09627-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09627-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The notion of epistemic injustice was first applied to cases of discrimination against women and people of color but has since come to refer to wider issues related to social justice. This paper applies the concept of epistemic injustice to problems in the therapeutic relationship between psychiatrists and psychiatric patients. To this end, it is necessary to acknowledge psychiatrists as professionals with expertise in treating mental disorders, which impair the patient's rationality, sometimes leading to false beliefs, such as delusions. This paper classifies the characteristic features of the therapeutic relationship in psychiatry into three stages: those of a professional-client relationship, those of a doctor-patient relationship, and those of a psychiatrist-psychiatric patient relationship. Epistemic injustice is prevalent in psychiatric care owing to prejudice against patients with mental disorders. However, it is also predisposed by the roles that psychiatrists play in relation to psychiatric patients. This paper suggests some ameliorative measures based on the analysis.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"477-502"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10564806/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10074404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01Epub Date: 2023-05-03DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09621-7
Ming-Jui Yeh
Unwanted children are carried, born, and reluctantly raised each year; they are prone to abortion, abandonment, neglect, and abuse. Meanwhile, many developed societies are suffering from depopulation. To address these two issues concurrently, I propose that governments should grant pregnant women and mothers an irreversible and unconditional one-time chance to relinquish all their legal rights and obligations associated with each of their children under a specific age to a National Rearing Institute that adopts the children and rears them to the age when they can fully exercise their rights as adult citizens. I call this set of policy arrangements "Project New Republicans." This project aims to (1) protect and support the best interests of unwanted children, (2) maximize the health outcomes of the mothers who gave birth to these children and help the mothers to achieve self-realization, and (3) preserve an influx to the population from procreation against depopulation. The project is primarily grounded on both the utilitarian and intra- / inter-generational accounts of justice. It also ameliorates the oppression and domination of women by unjust social structures in alignment with the human rights-based approach.
{"title":"Saving unwanted children: a proposal for a National Rearing Institute.","authors":"Ming-Jui Yeh","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09621-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09621-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Unwanted children are carried, born, and reluctantly raised each year; they are prone to abortion, abandonment, neglect, and abuse. Meanwhile, many developed societies are suffering from depopulation. To address these two issues concurrently, I propose that governments should grant pregnant women and mothers an irreversible and unconditional one-time chance to relinquish all their legal rights and obligations associated with each of their children under a specific age to a National Rearing Institute that adopts the children and rears them to the age when they can fully exercise their rights as adult citizens. I call this set of policy arrangements \"Project New Republicans.\" This project aims to (1) protect and support the best interests of unwanted children, (2) maximize the health outcomes of the mothers who gave birth to these children and help the mothers to achieve self-realization, and (3) preserve an influx to the population from procreation against depopulation. The project is primarily grounded on both the utilitarian and intra- / inter-generational accounts of justice. It also ameliorates the oppression and domination of women by unjust social structures in alignment with the human rights-based approach.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"435-452"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9768982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-01Epub Date: 2023-05-25DOI: 10.1007/s11017-023-09618-2
Camilo Sánchez Sánchez
This work begins with a brief review - from the physical education movement that began in ancient Greece and is deeply rooted in 19th century Europe, to the somatics movement alive today. The review captures primary historical and conceptual references, relevant to the therapeutic-embodied exploratory work. Then, G. Stanghellini's mental health care model [2] is reviewed. This model is considered within reflexive self-awareness and spoken dialogue: the main vehicles in relation with alterity and its consequences in the realm of psychotherapeutic encounter and intervention. This will highlight the individual's bodily movement and inter-corporeal 'proto-dialogue' as a prior realm of therapeutic intervention. Next, a brief consideration of E. Strauss work [31] is presented. This paper's hypothesis is that bodily qualitative dynamics highlighted by phenomenology are essential for an effective mental health therapeutic intervention. A 'seed' of a framework is proposed in this paper; this seed assesses some phenomenological assets of a positive conception of mental health, for which self-awareness education is key to develop skills such as kinaesthetic intelligence and attunement and to educate healthy persons who can promote edifying social relations and environments.
{"title":"Somatics and phenomenological psychopathology: a mental health proposal.","authors":"Camilo Sánchez Sánchez","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09618-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11017-023-09618-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This work begins with a brief review - from the physical education movement that began in ancient Greece and is deeply rooted in 19th century Europe, to the somatics movement alive today. The review captures primary historical and conceptual references, relevant to the therapeutic-embodied exploratory work. Then, G. Stanghellini's mental health care model [2] is reviewed. This model is considered within reflexive self-awareness and spoken dialogue: the main vehicles in relation with alterity and its consequences in the realm of psychotherapeutic encounter and intervention. This will highlight the individual's bodily movement and inter-corporeal 'proto-dialogue' as a prior realm of therapeutic intervention. Next, a brief consideration of E. Strauss work [31] is presented. This paper's hypothesis is that bodily qualitative dynamics highlighted by phenomenology are essential for an effective mental health therapeutic intervention. A 'seed' of a framework is proposed in this paper; this seed assesses some phenomenological assets of a positive conception of mental health, for which self-awareness education is key to develop skills such as kinaesthetic intelligence and attunement and to educate healthy persons who can promote edifying social relations and environments.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":"503-532"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10564660/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9575088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}