{"title":"言论自由怀疑论。","authors":"Susan J Brison","doi":"10.1353/ken.2021.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>If the free speech clause of the First Amendment is interpreted to mean that speech is to be granted special protection not accorded to other forms of conduct, then a free speech principle, distinct from a principle of general liberty, must be posited and must receive a distinct justification. A defense of a free speech principle must explain why the harm principle either does not apply in the case of speech or applies with less force than in the case of all other forms of human conduct. In this article, I argue that none of the defenses of the right to free speech on offer succeeds in showing why even significantly harmful speech is deserving of special protection not afforded non-speech conduct. More work needs to be done to justify a free speech principle and, until such work is done, the belief in the existence of a free speech principle that undergirds and justifies our current free speech practices is no more than an article of faith.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2021.0008","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Free Speech Skepticism.\",\"authors\":\"Susan J Brison\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/ken.2021.0008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>If the free speech clause of the First Amendment is interpreted to mean that speech is to be granted special protection not accorded to other forms of conduct, then a free speech principle, distinct from a principle of general liberty, must be posited and must receive a distinct justification. A defense of a free speech principle must explain why the harm principle either does not apply in the case of speech or applies with less force than in the case of all other forms of human conduct. In this article, I argue that none of the defenses of the right to free speech on offer succeeds in showing why even significantly harmful speech is deserving of special protection not afforded non-speech conduct. More work needs to be done to justify a free speech principle and, until such work is done, the belief in the existence of a free speech principle that undergirds and justifies our current free speech practices is no more than an article of faith.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46167,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1353/ken.2021.0008\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2021.0008\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2021.0008","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
If the free speech clause of the First Amendment is interpreted to mean that speech is to be granted special protection not accorded to other forms of conduct, then a free speech principle, distinct from a principle of general liberty, must be posited and must receive a distinct justification. A defense of a free speech principle must explain why the harm principle either does not apply in the case of speech or applies with less force than in the case of all other forms of human conduct. In this article, I argue that none of the defenses of the right to free speech on offer succeeds in showing why even significantly harmful speech is deserving of special protection not afforded non-speech conduct. More work needs to be done to justify a free speech principle and, until such work is done, the belief in the existence of a free speech principle that undergirds and justifies our current free speech practices is no more than an article of faith.
期刊介绍:
The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal offers a scholarly forum for diverse views on major issues in bioethics, such as analysis and critique of principlism, feminist perspectives in bioethics, the work of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, active euthanasia, genetics, health care reform, and organ transplantation. Each issue includes "Scope Notes," an overview and extensive annotated bibliography on a specific topic in bioethics, and "Bioethics Inside the Beltway," a report written by a Washington insider updating bioethics activities on the federal level.