{"title":"同意必须被告知吗?病人的权利,国家的权力,以及医生披露义务的道德基础。","authors":"D Robert MacDougall","doi":"10.1353/ken.2021.0021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Legal standards of disclosure in a variety of jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients about the likely consequences of treatment, as a condition for obtaining the patient's consent. Such a duty to inform is special insofar as extensive disclosure of risks and potential benefits is not usually a condition for obtaining consent in non-medical transactions.What could morally justify the physician's special legal duty to inform? I argue that existing justifications have tried but failed to ground such special duties directly in basic and general rights, such as autonomy rights. As an alternative to such direct justifications, I develop an indirect justification of physicians' special duties from an argument in Kant's political philosophy. Kant argues that pre-legal rights to freedom are the source of a duty to form a state. The state has the authority to conclusively determine what counts as \"consent\" in various kinds of transactions. The Kantian account can subsequently indirectly justify at least one legal standard imposing a duty to inform, the reasonable person standard, but rules out one interpretation of a competitor, the subjective standard.</p>","PeriodicalId":46167,"journal":{"name":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","volume":"31 3","pages":"247-270"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Must Consent Be Informed? Patient rights, state authority, and the moral basis of the physician's duties of disclosure.\",\"authors\":\"D Robert MacDougall\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/ken.2021.0021\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Legal standards of disclosure in a variety of jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients about the likely consequences of treatment, as a condition for obtaining the patient's consent. Such a duty to inform is special insofar as extensive disclosure of risks and potential benefits is not usually a condition for obtaining consent in non-medical transactions.What could morally justify the physician's special legal duty to inform? I argue that existing justifications have tried but failed to ground such special duties directly in basic and general rights, such as autonomy rights. As an alternative to such direct justifications, I develop an indirect justification of physicians' special duties from an argument in Kant's political philosophy. Kant argues that pre-legal rights to freedom are the source of a duty to form a state. The state has the authority to conclusively determine what counts as \\\"consent\\\" in various kinds of transactions. The Kantian account can subsequently indirectly justify at least one legal standard imposing a duty to inform, the reasonable person standard, but rules out one interpretation of a competitor, the subjective standard.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46167,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal\",\"volume\":\"31 3\",\"pages\":\"247-270\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2021.0021\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2021.0021","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Must Consent Be Informed? Patient rights, state authority, and the moral basis of the physician's duties of disclosure.
Legal standards of disclosure in a variety of jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients about the likely consequences of treatment, as a condition for obtaining the patient's consent. Such a duty to inform is special insofar as extensive disclosure of risks and potential benefits is not usually a condition for obtaining consent in non-medical transactions.What could morally justify the physician's special legal duty to inform? I argue that existing justifications have tried but failed to ground such special duties directly in basic and general rights, such as autonomy rights. As an alternative to such direct justifications, I develop an indirect justification of physicians' special duties from an argument in Kant's political philosophy. Kant argues that pre-legal rights to freedom are the source of a duty to form a state. The state has the authority to conclusively determine what counts as "consent" in various kinds of transactions. The Kantian account can subsequently indirectly justify at least one legal standard imposing a duty to inform, the reasonable person standard, but rules out one interpretation of a competitor, the subjective standard.
期刊介绍:
The Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal offers a scholarly forum for diverse views on major issues in bioethics, such as analysis and critique of principlism, feminist perspectives in bioethics, the work of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, active euthanasia, genetics, health care reform, and organ transplantation. Each issue includes "Scope Notes," an overview and extensive annotated bibliography on a specific topic in bioethics, and "Bioethics Inside the Beltway," a report written by a Washington insider updating bioethics activities on the federal level.