{"title":"随机收益多人博弈中固定概率下的合作演化","authors":"Dhaker Kroumi , Éloi Martin , Sabin Lessard","doi":"10.1016/j.tpb.2022.02.001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effect of variability in payoffs on the evolution of cooperation (<span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span>) against defection (<span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span>) in multi-player games in a finite well-mixed population. We show that an increase in the covariance between any two payoffs to <span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span>, or a decrease in the covariance between any two payoffs to <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span>, increases the probability of ultimate fixation of <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span> when represented once, and decreases the corresponding fixation probability for <span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span>. This is also the case with an increase in the covariance between any payoff to <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span> and any payoff to <span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span> if and only if the sum of the numbers of <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span>-players in the group associated with these payoffs is large enough compared to the group size. In classical social dilemmas with random cost and benefit for cooperation, the evolution of <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span> is more likely to occur if the variances of the cost and benefit, as well as the group size, are small, while the covariance between cost and benefit is large.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49437,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Population Biology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs\",\"authors\":\"Dhaker Kroumi , Éloi Martin , Sabin Lessard\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.tpb.2022.02.001\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We study the effect of variability in payoffs on the evolution of cooperation (<span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span>) against defection (<span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span>) in multi-player games in a finite well-mixed population. We show that an increase in the covariance between any two payoffs to <span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span>, or a decrease in the covariance between any two payoffs to <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span>, increases the probability of ultimate fixation of <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span> when represented once, and decreases the corresponding fixation probability for <span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span>. This is also the case with an increase in the covariance between any payoff to <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span> and any payoff to <span><math><mi>D</mi></math></span> if and only if the sum of the numbers of <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span>-players in the group associated with these payoffs is large enough compared to the group size. In classical social dilemmas with random cost and benefit for cooperation, the evolution of <span><math><mi>C</mi></math></span> is more likely to occur if the variances of the cost and benefit, as well as the group size, are small, while the covariance between cost and benefit is large.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":49437,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Theoretical Population Biology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Theoretical Population Biology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"99\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580922000120\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"生物学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoretical Population Biology","FirstCategoryId":"99","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580922000120","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"生物学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs
We study the effect of variability in payoffs on the evolution of cooperation () against defection () in multi-player games in a finite well-mixed population. We show that an increase in the covariance between any two payoffs to , or a decrease in the covariance between any two payoffs to , increases the probability of ultimate fixation of when represented once, and decreases the corresponding fixation probability for . This is also the case with an increase in the covariance between any payoff to and any payoff to if and only if the sum of the numbers of -players in the group associated with these payoffs is large enough compared to the group size. In classical social dilemmas with random cost and benefit for cooperation, the evolution of is more likely to occur if the variances of the cost and benefit, as well as the group size, are small, while the covariance between cost and benefit is large.
期刊介绍:
An interdisciplinary journal, Theoretical Population Biology presents articles on theoretical aspects of the biology of populations, particularly in the areas of demography, ecology, epidemiology, evolution, and genetics. Emphasis is on the development of mathematical theory and models that enhance the understanding of biological phenomena.
Articles highlight the motivation and significance of the work for advancing progress in biology, relying on a substantial mathematical effort to obtain biological insight. The journal also presents empirical results and computational and statistical methods directly impinging on theoretical problems in population biology.