{"title":"Bothsiderism。","authors":"Scott F. Aikin, John P. Casey","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper offers an account of a fallacy we will call <i>bothsiderism</i>, which is to mistake disagreement on an issue for evidence that either a compromise on, suspension of judgment regarding, or continued discussion of the issue is in order. Our view is that this is a fallacy of a unique and heretofore untheorized type, a fallacy of meta-argumentation. The paper develops as follows. After a brief introduction, we examine a recent bothsiderist case in American politics. We use this as a pivot point to survey the theoretical literature on the fallacy. The most prominent theory is that bothsiderism is a case of dialogue-shifting. This view fails, we maintain, to explain how bothsiderism might be persuasive. We argue, rather, bothsiderism is a kind of meta-argumentative fallacy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1.pdf","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bothsiderism\",\"authors\":\"Scott F. Aikin, John P. Casey\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper offers an account of a fallacy we will call <i>bothsiderism</i>, which is to mistake disagreement on an issue for evidence that either a compromise on, suspension of judgment regarding, or continued discussion of the issue is in order. Our view is that this is a fallacy of a unique and heretofore untheorized type, a fallacy of meta-argumentation. The paper develops as follows. After a brief introduction, we examine a recent bothsiderist case in American politics. We use this as a pivot point to survey the theoretical literature on the fallacy. The most prominent theory is that bothsiderism is a case of dialogue-shifting. This view fails, we maintain, to explain how bothsiderism might be persuasive. We argue, rather, bothsiderism is a kind of meta-argumentative fallacy.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46219,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Argumentation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Argumentation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"文学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMMUNICATION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Argumentation","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper offers an account of a fallacy we will call bothsiderism, which is to mistake disagreement on an issue for evidence that either a compromise on, suspension of judgment regarding, or continued discussion of the issue is in order. Our view is that this is a fallacy of a unique and heretofore untheorized type, a fallacy of meta-argumentation. The paper develops as follows. After a brief introduction, we examine a recent bothsiderist case in American politics. We use this as a pivot point to survey the theoretical literature on the fallacy. The most prominent theory is that bothsiderism is a case of dialogue-shifting. This view fails, we maintain, to explain how bothsiderism might be persuasive. We argue, rather, bothsiderism is a kind of meta-argumentative fallacy.
期刊介绍：
Argumentation is an international and interdisciplinary journal. Its aim is to gather academic contributions from a wide range of scholarly backgrounds and approaches to reasoning, natural inference and persuasion: communication, rhetoric (classical and modern), linguistics, discourse analysis, pragmatics, psychology, philosophy, logic (formal and informal), critical thinking, history and law. Its scope includes a diversity of interests, varying from philosophical, theoretical and analytical to empirical and practical topics. Argumentation publishes papers, book reviews, a yearly bibliography, and announcements of conferences and seminars.To be considered for publication in the journal, a paper must satisfy all of these criteria:1. Report research that is within the journals’ scope: concentrating on argumentation 2. Pose a clear and relevant research question 3. Make a contribution to the literature that connects with the state of the art in the field of argumentation theory 4. Be sound in methodology and analysis 5. Provide appropriate evidence and argumentation for the conclusions 6. Be presented in a clear and intelligible fashion in standard English
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