{"title":"非对称负担分担与联盟的约束威慑作用","authors":"Yukari Iwanami","doi":"10.1177/00223433231158146","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Alliances are often presumed to serve the dual purpose of restraint and deterrence, though few existing studies examine their relationship and the connection with defense burden-sharing. This research employs a three-player game-theoretic model, which endogenizes the process of alliance formation and arms buildups, to demonstrate how intra-alliance burden-sharing allows the alliance to preserve the status quo. The results suggest that alliance burden-sharing may exert the deterrence and restraining effects, while at most one effect is observable at a time because the effects occur in separate parameter spaces. If a prospective ally’s cost of arms buildups is relatively low, a status-quo-oriented superpower may form an alliance even by shouldering a disproportionately heavy burden to dissuade the ally from overturning the status quo ( the restraining effect). Conversely, if the cost is relatively high, the superpower may form an alliance to protect the ally from external threats ( the deterrence effect). However, to prevent being exploited by this ally, the superpower provides only the units of armed forces that are sufficient to incentivize the ally to bolster its military capabilities to deter the threats. Their alliance entails power aggrandizement, but it does not provoke a non-signatory as the ally remains too weak to act unilaterally.","PeriodicalId":48324,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Peace Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Asymmetric burden-sharing and the restraining and deterrence effects of alliances\",\"authors\":\"Yukari Iwanami\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00223433231158146\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Alliances are often presumed to serve the dual purpose of restraint and deterrence, though few existing studies examine their relationship and the connection with defense burden-sharing. This research employs a three-player game-theoretic model, which endogenizes the process of alliance formation and arms buildups, to demonstrate how intra-alliance burden-sharing allows the alliance to preserve the status quo. The results suggest that alliance burden-sharing may exert the deterrence and restraining effects, while at most one effect is observable at a time because the effects occur in separate parameter spaces. If a prospective ally’s cost of arms buildups is relatively low, a status-quo-oriented superpower may form an alliance even by shouldering a disproportionately heavy burden to dissuade the ally from overturning the status quo ( the restraining effect). Conversely, if the cost is relatively high, the superpower may form an alliance to protect the ally from external threats ( the deterrence effect). However, to prevent being exploited by this ally, the superpower provides only the units of armed forces that are sufficient to incentivize the ally to bolster its military capabilities to deter the threats. Their alliance entails power aggrandizement, but it does not provoke a non-signatory as the ally remains too weak to act unilaterally.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48324,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Peace Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Peace Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231158146\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Peace Research","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231158146","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Asymmetric burden-sharing and the restraining and deterrence effects of alliances
Alliances are often presumed to serve the dual purpose of restraint and deterrence, though few existing studies examine their relationship and the connection with defense burden-sharing. This research employs a three-player game-theoretic model, which endogenizes the process of alliance formation and arms buildups, to demonstrate how intra-alliance burden-sharing allows the alliance to preserve the status quo. The results suggest that alliance burden-sharing may exert the deterrence and restraining effects, while at most one effect is observable at a time because the effects occur in separate parameter spaces. If a prospective ally’s cost of arms buildups is relatively low, a status-quo-oriented superpower may form an alliance even by shouldering a disproportionately heavy burden to dissuade the ally from overturning the status quo ( the restraining effect). Conversely, if the cost is relatively high, the superpower may form an alliance to protect the ally from external threats ( the deterrence effect). However, to prevent being exploited by this ally, the superpower provides only the units of armed forces that are sufficient to incentivize the ally to bolster its military capabilities to deter the threats. Their alliance entails power aggrandizement, but it does not provoke a non-signatory as the ally remains too weak to act unilaterally.
期刊介绍:
Journal of Peace Research is an interdisciplinary and international peer reviewed bimonthly journal of scholarly work in peace research. Edited at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), by an international editorial committee, Journal of Peace Research strives for a global focus on conflict and peacemaking. From its establishment in 1964, authors from over 50 countries have published in JPR. The Journal encourages a wide conception of peace, but focuses on the causes of violence and conflict resolution. Without sacrificing the requirements for theoretical rigour and methodological sophistication, articles directed towards ways and means of peace are favoured.