高管薪酬潮和股价崩盘风险

IF 1.8 Q3 MANAGEMENT Nankai Business Review International Pub Date : 2021-09-16 DOI:10.1108/nbri-10-2018-0062
Hong Luo, Junfeng Wu, Wanjun Huang, Yongliang Zeng
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目的研究薪酬风潮引发的高管自利行为对中国上市公司股价暴跌风险的影响,并试图揭示这种影响的影响渠道。设计/方法论/方法实证分析基于面板数据集,该数据集包含2007-2015年11710个公司年度观察的高管和股价信息。采用多元线性回归模型来检验高管薪酬潮流是否会影响企业未来股价暴跌风险。然后,将盈余管理、避税和过度投资作为高管薪酬潮流的行为选择,分析其潜在的影响渠道。研究结果表明,在规模和行业相似的公司中,高管的薪酬水平越低,薪酬潮流的激励作用越强,导致未来股价暴跌的风险越高。此外,有证据表明,当企业拥有强大的外部监督机制,如四大审计师、香港证券交易所交叉上市、高度市场化进程和高度机构所有权时,高管薪酬潮流与崩溃风险之间的正相关关系减弱。然后,一些薄弱的证据支持内部控制等内部治理也起着同样的调节作用。此外,基于路径检验,高管薪酬风潮的股价暴跌效应具有完全的避税中介效应和部分的盈余管理中介效应。原创性/价值本研究从心理学的角度对高管薪酬文献进行了贡献,研究了中国上市公司薪酬风潮带来的经济后果。此外,本文对影响未来股价暴跌风险的因素进行了补充,这些因素与以往的研究完全不同。
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Executive pay bandwagon and stock price crash risk
Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of executives’ self-interested behaviors induced by the pay bandwagon on stock price crash risk in Chinese listed firms and attempt to shed light on the influencing channels of this effect. Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is based on the panel data set which contains information on the executives and stock price of 11,710 firm-year observations over the period 2007–2015. The multiple linear regression models are implemented to examine whether the executive pay bandwagon affects corporate future stock price crash risk. Then, earnings management, tax avoidance and overinvestment are applied as the behavior choice of executive pay bandwagon to analyze the potential influencing channels. Findings Results indicate that the lower the executives’ pay is than the median pay level of executives in firms of similar size and industry, incentives of pay bandwagon are stronger, leading to a higher future stock price crash risk. Moreover, evidence shows that the positive relationship between executive pay bandwagon and crash risk is attenuated when firms have strong external monitoring mechanisms such as Big Four auditors, cross-listing in the Hong Kong stock exchange, high marketization process and high institutional ownership. Then, some weak evidence supports that internal governance such as internal control plays the same moderating role. In addition, based on the path test, the stock price crash effect of the executive pay bandwagon has a complete tax avoidance intermediary effect and a partial earnings management intermediary effect. Originality/value This study contributes to the executive compensation literature from a psychological perspective on the economic consequences research brought about by the pay bandwagon for China’s listed firms. Moreover, this paper provides a supplement to the literature on factors which is completely different from previous studies that affect the future stock price crash risk.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
3.60%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Nankai Business Review International (NBRI) provides insights in to the adaptation of American and European management theory in China, the differences and exchanges between Chinese and western management styles, the relationship between Chinese enterprises’ management practice and social evolution and showcases the development and evolution of management theories based on Chinese cultural characteristics. The journal provides research of interest to managers and entrepreneurs worldwide with an interest in China as well as research associations and scholars focusing on Chinese problems in business and management.
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