Understanding Replication in a Way That Is True to Science

In this article, I critically examine a number of widely held beliefs about the nature of replication and its place in science, with particular reference to psychology. In doing so, I present a number of underappreciated understandings of the nature of science more generally. I contend that some contributors to the replication debates overstate the importance of replication in science and mischaracterize the relationship between direct and conceptual replication. I also claim that there has been a failure to appreciate sufficiently the variety of legitimate replication practices that scientists engage in. In this regard, I highlight the tendency to pay insufficient attention to methodological triangulation as an important strategy for justifying empirical claims. I argue, further, that the replication debates tend to overstate the closeness of the relationship between replication and theory construction. Some features of this relationship are spelt out with reference to the hypothetico-deductive and the abductive accounts of scientific method. Additionally, an evaluation of the status of replication in different characterizations of scientific progress is undertaken. I maintain that viewing replication as just one element of the wide array of scientific endeavors leads to the conclusion that it is not as prominent in science as is often claimed.