Judging as Crime: A Transatlantic Perspective on Criminalizing Excesses of Judicial Discretion

Drawing on over a century and a half of Germany’s experience with a statute that criminalizes (mis)judging, this Article seeks to substantiate that criminal penalties for judges were largely ineffectual, and that courts proved ill-suited to police themselves even with a judiciary-specific criminal statute in place. To reach this conclusion, this post hoc longitudinal study examines German statutory foundations for the crime of “law bending” (Rechtsbeugung), related legal history, and jurisprudence during three distinct periods: (1) the codification of Rechtsbeugung in 1851 through the end of World War II; (2) Rechtsbeugung jurisprudence in postwar Germany, particularly as related to Nazi-era judicial actions; and (3) Rechtsbeugung legislative changes and jurisprudence leading up to and following Germany’s reunification. The German experience with Rechtsbeugung provides a cautionary tale of judges’ unwillingness to hold other judges criminally responsible, even for the worst of judicial transgressions, such as those committed by judges in Nazi Germany. Following German reunification, the court was less lenient in cases of East German judges. In this context, the court came to renounce its postwar Rechtsbeugung jurisprudence in clear and decisive terms, and affirmed convictions of East German judges. Yet, German high court jurisprudence remains elusive to this day.