{"title":"政治合法性的不透明","authors":"Matthias Brinkmann","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1533","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Some moral value istransparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasiblycome to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In thispaper, I consider whether legitimacy—that is, the property of exercises ofpolitical power to be (at least) permissible—is transparent. Implicit in muchtheorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer twocounter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can beintransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical function in our practicalthought, which sometimes requires intransparency.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Intransparency of Political Legitimacy\",\"authors\":\"Matthias Brinkmann\",\"doi\":\"10.3998/phimp.1533\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Some moral value istransparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasiblycome to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In thispaper, I consider whether legitimacy—that is, the property of exercises ofpolitical power to be (at least) permissible—is transparent. Implicit in muchtheorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer twocounter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can beintransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical function in our practicalthought, which sometimes requires intransparency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":20021,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophers' Imprint\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophers' Imprint\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1533\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophers' Imprint","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1533","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Some moral value istransparent just in case an agent with average mental capacities can feasiblycome to know whether some entity does, or does not, possess that value. In thispaper, I consider whether legitimacy—that is, the property of exercises ofpolitical power to be (at least) permissible—is transparent. Implicit in muchtheorising about legitimacy is the idea that it is. I will offer twocounter-arguments. First, injustice can defeat legitimacy, and injustice can beintransparent. Second, legitimacy can play a critical function in our practicalthought, which sometimes requires intransparency.